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 Introduction 
 
In 2014, The United Nations General Assembly made front-page news by 
endorsing a recent report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry, which detailed 
crimes against humanity committed by North Korea.  The General Assembly made a 
recommendation to the Security Council to discuss the report and consider referring it to 
the International Criminal Court.1  Several questions came to mind after hearing this 
announcement; how has the North Korean regime been able to commit human rights 
violations for decades without interference?  Why did it take the International community 
so long to recommend that North Korea face judgment for their human rights violations?   
To try to understand “why,” this essay will look at North Korea’s historical 
experiences that took place before, during, and after Japanese colonialism through the 
Korean Civil War in an effort to identify how they influenced early policies.  More so how 
these policies would allow Kim Il-sung reach the level of supreme leader and establish 
his family as hereditary authoritarian rulers.  How these original policies would create a 
government that would allow human rights abuses to become daily violations and to 
become a country that appears to be in a state of chronic crisis.  All in an effort to figure 
out if there is in fact anything the international community could do to convince North 
Korea to enact reforms that will stabilize their country and bring an end to their human 
rights abuses.  This topic is an intricately woven conundrum that raises questions, while 
offering very few answers. 
 
  
                                                          
1 "North Korea: UN Condemns Crimes Against Humanity," Human Rights Watch, last modified November 18, 2014, accessed 
October 22, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/18/north-korea-un-condemns-crimes-against-humanity. 
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North Korea is not an old country, its creation occurred after World War II, 
following forty years of Japanese rule.  When Kim Il-sung came to rule he understood 
the power a cult personality and used it as a politician to build up a nation that would 
eventually view him, and ultimately his descendents, as deities.  He was willing to 
borrow political ideas from the past and then transformed these ideas to suit his own 
motives.  He used his charisma to mobilize the masses around these new policies and 
push forth his agenda.  Later he was able to use his cult persona and his political power 
to secure a hereditary authoritarianism for his son and grandson.  He was able to 
complete this in less than sixty years. 
North Korea closed its boarders during the 1960s allowing very little information 
from within North Korean to reach the outside world.  Official reports come directly from 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, although, they only release the information 
they wish to share.  Other paths of information come from escaped North Koreans, 
intelligence agencies in South Korean, Japanese, and United States or from South 
Korean or Chinese import and export records.  The majority of escapees come from the 
lowest class in society.  They can only report on what the officials have disclosed 
through propaganda or policies that affect their daily lives, or what they have personally 
witnessed.  The intelligence reports are questionable due to the possibility of being bias 
in their assessment of the country while the import and export records only include 
legally exchanged items.  
North Korea’s closed society policy means very little information is available to 
study the country.  Writing this report was challenging as there is a lot written on North 
Korea using the same small amounts of data, frequently reiterating the same 
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testimonies and statistics.  Most publications focused on one area, such as the 
country’s history, economics problems, the nuclear program, agriculture, or a specific 
human rights violation.  Very few publications cover all the issues unless they were 
quick summaries of the problems.  Another challenge had to do with contradictions 
revolving around dates of events, when the policies were enacted and which regime 
leader was given credit for originating the policies.  One such example is the “two-meal 
a day program,” some authors credit Kim Il-sung as the creator of this policy, while other 
authors credit Kim Jong-il as the creator.  Additional confusion concerns when the policy 
was first implemented, depending on the author, the policies enactment first occurred in 
1991, 1993, 1994, or 1995.  On other polices there was no information regarding the 
exact date or when the event happened, they are only credited to a particular decade.  
The contradictions that were found required verification from duplicate sources. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One  
Colonialism and the Division of Korea 
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Pre - History 
In the 14th century, the Chosŏn dynasty established a class-based system called 
the “Yangban.”2  Yangban combined military and scholar officials into a small 
aristocratic elite group who ruled over the peasants, merchants, and laborers, and 
practiced slavery and indentured servitude.3  Initially the system awarded elite status to 
men who passed a rigorous civil service exam.4  Those who belonged to the Yangban 
class separated themselves from other classes.5  They did not live next to those who 
were not Yangban, nor did they marry outside their class, eventually creating a class 
and institution in which elite status “was passed down through the generations and no 
longer earned.”6  The Chosŏn dynasty “held limited power, and for the most part were 
not respected by the Yangban.”7  To garner favor the monarchy bestowed large gifts of 
nontaxable land, putting the economic tax burden onto the lower classes.8  In the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the old social distinctions were breaking down, 
there was a counterfeit genealogy market where commoners could attach their names 
to Yangban genealogies and elevate their status.  In the nineteenth century, during a 
Japanese invasion, the army destroyed many genealogical records, making it difficult to 
determine who was or was not a member of a Yangban family.9 
                                                          
2 Chun-gil Kim, The History of Korea (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), 75. 
3 Ibid 
4 Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., "Traditional Social Structure,"United States Library of Congress, last modified 
1990, accessed October 22, 2015, http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/35.htm. 
5 Ki-baek Yi, A New History of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Published for the Harvard-Yenching Institute by Harvard University Press, 
1984), 174. 
6 Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1963), 10. 
7 Mary E. Connor, The Koreas: A Global Studies Handbook (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC CLIO, 2002), 24. 
8 Ibid  
9 Savada and Shaw, "Traditional Social Structure,"United States Library of Congress. 
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Prior to the eighteenth century, Korean foreign relations consisted of annual trips 
to China to pay tribute to the Emperor with limited contact with Japan.  Korea’s external 
problems began when Japanese warships invaded, in 1876, demanding diplomatic and 
commercial relations and forcing Korea to end its long established policy of isolation 
with the “Kanghwa Treaty.”10  This treaty declared Korea a sovereign nation, allowing 
Japan to move aggressively toward Korea without interference from China.  During the 
nineteenth century, Korea experienced internal problems between the Chosŏn dynasty 
King and Queen.  The King supported Japan’s influence and the Queen wished to expel 
Japan and follow in China’s path.  Eventually Japanese assassins executed the Queen 
in 1895.11  Externally Korea found itself at the center of rivalries between England, 
Russia, Japan, and China, who all wanted its resources.  Korea signed the “Treaty of 
Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation,”12 with the United States in 1882, and later 
signed similar treaties with Britain Germany, Italy, Russia, France, and Austria-Hungry, 
opening up further foreign relations.  A United States diplomatic envoy arrived in 1883, 
in the wake of the treaty, and stayed until 1905, when Japan assumed total control of 
Korean foreign affairs.13   
In 1904, Japan declared war on Russia for refusing to withdraw its troops from 
Manchuria, and quickly won.  This was a major coup for Japan as they had taken on a 
world power and won.  With negotiating help from the United States, Japan and Russia 
signed the “Portsmouth Treaty,” in 1906, where Russia acknowledged Japan’s right to 
                                                          
10 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 30. 
11Henry Chung, The Case of Korea: A Collection of Evidence on the Japanese Domination of Korea, and on the Development of the 
Korean Independence Movement (London: Routledge, 2011), 25. 
12 "COREA Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," Department of State, accessed October 22, 2015, 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/June_2012/1-1822%20Treaty.pdf. 
13 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 31. 
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Korea.14  Previously Japan signed the “Taft-Katsura Treaty” with the United States, in 
1905, which allowed Japan free reign in Korea in exchange for the promise from Japan 
not to interfere with the Philippines.15  As long as Japan directed its imperialism away 
from American and British possessions, it had the support of the Western powers.16  In 
1905, Japan made Korea a protectorate.  Initially the Korean government supported 
Japan’s imperialism, and the government signed over the peninsula in exchange for 
Japanese arranged pensions, payments, and honors for the leading Yangban 
noblemen.  By 1910, Japan took total control of Korea, dissolving the Chosŏn dynasty, 
the monarchy as the government, and the Korean nation itself.  This began the 35-year 
period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea, which lasted until 1945 when Japan 
surrendered at the end of the Second World War.17   
Japanese Colonialism 
 
The period between 1910 through 1945 is crucial in understanding the post 
Second World War attitudes towards the Japanese that played out in the creation of the 
two Korea states.  During 1910 through 1919, the Japanese conducted the first phase 
of their colonial rule, which the military controlled.18  They establish a draconian police 
system that deprived Koreans of their basic freedoms: civil society was abolished, 
freedom of speech suspended, all the police became judge and jury.  The Japanese 
                                                          
14 "The Treaty of Portsmouth and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905,"United States Department of State Office of Historian, 
accessed October 22, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/portsmouth-treaty. 
15 "Japanese-American Relations at the Turn of the Century, 1900–1922,"United States Department of State Office of Historian, 
accessed October 22, 2015, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1899-1913/japanese-relations. 
16 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 35. 
17 Conrad Schirokauer and Donald N. Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief History, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 258. 
18 "Korea as a Colony of Japan, 1910-1945," Asia for Educators, last modified 2009, accessed October 22, 2015, 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm. 
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controlled civil service, education, and the government.19  Japan redesigned the Korean 
education system in order to condition Korean children to embody Japanese ideals, 
creating loyal subjects.  The Japanese reformed Korean land laws by requiring proof of 
ownership.  Most farmers did not have the proper papers, resulting in the loss of their 
land.  The Japanese land development companies transferred the seized land to 
Japanese investors and bureaucrats, or Japanese collaborators appointed to 
government and administrative positions.  The law reinforced class inequalities that had 
been in place for centuries by strengthening the positions of the wealthy and 
deteriorating the position of the small farm.  This economic gap helped set the stage for 
the violent left-right wing confrontations that followed the liberation of Korea in 1945.20  
The post Second World War “attitudes toward the Japanese and the impact of foreign 
domination helped stimulated Korean nationalism and influenced their cultural 
development creating class and ideological conflicts that persist today.”21 
The second phase took place between 1919 through 1931, and began with a 
nonviolent nationwide demonstration for independence from the Japanese.  The 
demonstrations failed and Koreans realized that Japan met direct confrontation with 
force, but it did succeed in unifying Korean nationals against the Japanese, and resulted 
in some reforms of Japan’s policies.  Japan enacted cultural policy reforms, hoping to 
improve world opinion concerning the occupation.22  Korean newspapers and 
magazines were to publish again, and civil society organizations became legalized.  
Koreans used this time of these reforms to preserve their culture and reeducate young 
                                                          
19 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 37. 
20 Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief, 260. 
21 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 36. 
22 Ibid 37. 
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Koreans in an effort to work towards liberation.23  It was during this phase that the split 
in ideals started to emerge into two factions: those who wished to preserve the Korean 
culture without overthrowing the Japanese regime, and those who violently wanted to 
overthrow the regime while restructuring Korean society to redistribute wealth.24  The 
Korean communities who went into exile also developed into factions: one group 
embraced Western ideals and eventually formed the Republic of Korea, and the other 
group embraced communist ideals.25  The class and ideological conflicts that developed 
during and after the period of Japanese occupation continue to influence both North and 
South Korea. 
In 1931 in Japan, the military took control of the government and seized 
Manchuria, abandoning any pretense of democracy as they chose militarism and war in 
their “Asia for Asians” campaign to expel Western imperial powers and widen their 
control over Asia.”26  Thus began the third phase of Japanese colonialism in Korea, 
where another round of reforms were enacted that lasted until Japan’s surrender in 
1945.  Japan reorganized the Korean infrastructure to supply resources for the 
Japanese military, and with this reorganization came a new phase of repression that 
amounted to the destruction of Korea cultural.27  Japan forcefully started assimilating 
Koreans into Japanese culture and political life.  They forced Koreans to worship the 
gods of imperial Japan.28  Japanese teachers taught Korean children, Japanese 
                                                          
23 Gi-Wook Shin, Ethnic Nationalism in Korea: Genealogy, Politics, and Legacy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
2006), 51. 
24 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 263. 
25 T. I. Han, Lonesome Hero: Memoir of a Korea War POW (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2011), 115. 
26 Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief, 265. 
27 Ibid  
28 Donald N. Clark, Culture and Customs of Korea (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), 49. 
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soldiers vandalized ancient temples.29  Koreans were forced to abandon their literature 
and history, the national anthem was banned, and their flag could not be flown.30  
Koreans had to dig up their national flower and plant cherry trees.31  One act required 
Koreans to adopt Japanese names; by the end of the war, more than 80% had 
complied.32  In a society where reverence for their ancestors and family lineage was 
paramount, this policy created a deep and lasting resentment.33  Many Koreans chose 
to collaborate with the Japanese, in an attempt to succeed within the colonial system.  
Rejection of the system was not a viable option as it resulted in poverty, or jail.  A few 
profited enormously and justified their collaboration because they felt they were helping 
Korea to modernize.34  Japans attempt to remodel Koreans into loyal subjects failed, 
Japanese people continued to discriminate against Koreans based on their ethnicity. 
Many recognizable modern aspects of Korean society emerged or grew 
considerably during Japanese colonial rule.  “Industrial development and expansion of 
commerce were encouraged by Japan for the primary purpose of enriching Japan itself 
and helping to promote its expansion throughout the Asian Pacific rather than for the 
benefit of the Korean people.”35  During the period of wartime mobilization from 1937 to 
1945, Japan reintroduced harsh measures to their colonial rule.  They instituted labor 
drafts that shipped Koreans to Japan against their will to provide services for the 
Japanese.  These services included serving in the Japanese armed forces as soldiers, 
working in military factories, and having the women serve as sex slaves for Japanese 
                                                          
29 Joan Ferrante-Wallace, Study Guide for Sociology: A Global Perspective, 6th ed. (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Pub., 2006), 60. 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid 
32 Korea as a Colony," Asia for Educators. 
33 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 41. 
34 Ibid 42 
35 Korea as a Colony," Asia  for Educators.  
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soldiers.36  Resistance groups began emerging to fight to free Korea from the Japanese; 
the non-communist Korean resistance formed the Korean Restoration Army in 1940, 
they worked with Chinese nationalist and the United States military advisors, while 
communist Koreans worked with Chinese communist.37  Japan displayed a lack of 
tolerance for communist ideals; they set about annihilating all factions of the Korean 
communist party.  In an effort to survive, the Korean communist party split into groups; 
with some going into exile in China or the Soviet Union, while others remained in the 
Korea Mountains to carrying on a guerrilla war along the Korean-Manchuria border.  It 
was in this last group that Kim Il-sung emerged as a military leader.38   
For the Korean people the legacy of Japanese colonialism revolves around 
“economic underdevelopment, social and psychological disruption, and the bitter fruits 
of collaboration.”39  With economic underdevelopment, Japan modernized Korea’s 
infrastructure during its occupation, but Koreans take exception to assertions that they 
should be grateful to Japan for improvements made under Japanese rule.  They argue 
that none of the improvements were implemented to benefit Korea but rather make to 
their colony more profitable for Japan.  Once the modern improvements were in place 
few Koreans were allowed to utilize or participate in them.  Those that were fortunate 
enough to do so were never allowed to advance beyond the lowest of positions, 
because they were not Japanese.  The social and psychological disruption stemmed 
from the fact that the more a person retained his or her Korean identity, the less likely 
he or she was to advance into a position of responsibility, and even rarer, a position of 
                                                          
36 "Korea as a Colony of Japan, 1910-1945," Asia for Educators, last modified 2009, accessed October 22, 2015, 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/main_pop/kpct/kp_koreaimperialism.htm. 
37 Gi-Wook Shin, Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014), 136. 
38 Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief, 265. 
39 Ibid 267 
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authority.40  When Korean students wished to obtain higher levels of education, they 
were required to go to Japan, discard their Korean identity, and become Japanese.  The 
legacy of collaboration left behind an accumulation of social, economic, and institutional 
frictions.   
After the liberation from Japan in 1945, Korean politics exploded as Koreans 
accused each other of collaboration and betrayal.  Koreans who served in Japanese 
colonial bureaucracy and as police were condemned as national traitors.  Many wealthy 
businessmen and landowners were accused of supporting Japan in order to save their 
fortunes.  At the end of the Second World War, the Korean people were surprised by 
the sudden collapse of Japan, especially those who chose to support Japan.  The 
collaboration issue became a point of contention, and instrumental to the separation of 
ideals in the North and South after liberation from Japan.41  The allies hoped the 
Koreans within Korea would follow the lead of the exiled Korean factions, as they did 
not have a “regime-in-waiting” to install in Korea after Japanese colonialists were 
removed.42 
The Division of Korea 
 
As the war with Japan was still ongoing, the “Cairo Conference” happened in 
1943.43  During this conference the allies, the United States, China, and The United 
Kingdom, pledged to strip Japan of all the territories it had acquired since 1894.44  They 
                                                          
40 Ezra F. Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1991), 49. 
41 Schirokauer and Clark, Modern East Asia: A Brief, 267. 
42 Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation, 55. 
43 "The Cairo Conference, 1943,"United States Department of State Archive, accessed October 23, 2015, http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/107184.htm. 
44 Ibid 
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determined that Korea was to be free and independent after an Allied victory.45  The 
strategic position of the Korean peninsula and its liberation from Japan became 
problematic between the two emerging super powers.  As the war in Europe was 
finishing, the Allied powers met in February 1945 for the “Yalta Conference.” 46  It was 
then that the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan, in the hopes of 
ending the Pacific war.  They began an invasion into Manchuria and proceeded to 
conduct landings into the Korean Peninsula.47  The United States understood that the 
Soviet Union had greater military power in Asia and could eventually control Korea 
outright, while the Soviet Union was concerned about the United States fully occupying 
Korea.   
The partition of Korea took shape during the “Postdam Conference" in July 
1945,48 with the allies deciding on a temporary demarcation line in order to accept the 
surrender of Japanese military forces.49  The Army Colonels Rusk and Bonesteel,50 
decided upon the 38th parallel on short notice, devised the idea to divide the Korean 
peninsula into two zones of control.51  They decided on the 38th parallel, as it left the 
capital Seoul within the American controlled area.52  When the United States suggested 
dividing Korea, the Soviet Union quickly agreed.  The belief is that Stalin’s quick 
                                                          
45 Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, eds., "World War II and Korea,"United States Library of Congress, last modified 1990, 
accessed October 22, 2015, http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/8.htm. 
46 "The Yalta Conference, 1945,"United States Department of State Office of Historian, accessed October 22, 2015, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf. 
47 Martin Ira Glassner, The United Nations at Work (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), 270. 
48 Peter Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China, and Korea, 1948-53 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997),169. 
49 Ciment et al., Encyclopedia of Conflicts since, 622. 
50 Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: The United States Defense Commitment to South Korea (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2006), 116. 
51 James I. Matray, "Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel," Pacific Historical Review 50, no. 2 
(May 1981): 148, accessed October 31, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3638724. 
52 Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation, 62. 
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response stemmed from not wishing to confront the United States by occupying the 
entire peninsula, and they hoped the United States would be willing to permit the Soviet 
Union to occupy the northern half of Japan.53   
During the December 1945 “Moscow Conference,” the United States, Soviet 
Union, China and The United Kingdom, agreed to Korea falling under a 4-power 
trusteeship.54  The United States felt that the Soviet Union’s familiarity with Korea’s 
history made them a practical candidate to share the occupational administrative duties 
of Korea during the five-year trusteeship.55  The Soviet Union arrived in North Korea 
prior to the surrender of Japan and planned to construct the North Korean government 
in the same manner they used to install communist governments in Eastern Europe.56  
The United States did not arrive in South Korea until after Japan had officially 
surrendered, and they did not arrive with a clear plan of action on how to help Korea 
become an independent nation.57  Once the two countries occupied Korea, the Soviet 
Union refused to work with the United States until an agreement was reached to 
establish a provisional government.58 
Once set up in South Korea the United States military government set about 
suppressing the newly formed localized governments fearing they were a part of a leftist 
movement conspiracy with the Soviet Union.59  Instead, the United States proceeded to 
form a new government made up of well-educated and English speaking Koreans who 
                                                          
53 Savada and Shaw, "World War II and Korea,"United States Library of Congress. 
54 "Incoming Message to CINCAFPAC [MacArthur] from Washington (War), nr WCL 32355 [Communiqué of Moscow Conference, 
December 27, 1945]," National Diet Library, accessed October 23, 2015, 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/053/053tx.html. 
55 Edward A. Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2005), 61. 
56 James Ciment et al., Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II (Armonk, NY: Sharpe Reference, 1999), 624. 
57 Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation, 63. 
58 Ciment et al., Encyclopedia of Conflicts since, 622. 
59 Connor, The Koreas: A Global, 44. 
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held anticommunist ideals or were usually Japanese collaborators.  Koreans saw that 
the United States elevated collaborators into positions of authority.  Many of the 
northern wealthy Koreans moved south in an effort to retain the wealth they had 
maintained or obtained during the Japanese occupation.  The United States policy 
assumed the role of protecting South Korea from communist control, which angered the 
Soviet Union and their Korean communist allies.   
In the North, Korean Provisional People’s Committees (NKPPC) removed all 
government administrators who were in place at the time of Japanese liberation under 
the NKPCC decree “Classification of Pro-Japan and Anti-Korean Elements.”60  The 
Soviet Union chose a different yet equally oppressive path in developing the localized 
governments into core institutions that reinforcement communist policy.61  One such 
organization was the “South Pyongyang Committee for the Preparation for 
Independence,” located in the capital of North Korea, operated by Cho Man-sik, a 
popular politician.62  The Soviet Union imprisoned Cho Man-sik for refusing to sign the 
declaration of support of trusteeship,63  and chose an interim ruler as his replacement: 
the 33-year-old Korean guerrilla hero Kim Il-sung.64  Kim II-sung had distinguished 
himself as a military leader in the Korean communist guerrilla army while fighting 
against Japan.  The Soviet Union continued to push aside any political leader who did 
not hold left-wing ideals.  In the north, official records show Kim Il-sung as the first 
                                                          
60 Timeline," The Committee For Human Rights In North Korea, accessed October 23, 2015, 
https://www.hrnk.org/publications/timeline.php. 
 Located within the 1946 Tab 
61 Olsen, Korea, the Divided Nation, 63. 
62 Christoph Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2011), 57. 
63 Ibid 
64 Ibid 58 
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leader of the North Korean Bureau of the Korean Communist Party.65  He created local 
communist parties throughout North Korea while eliminating “enemies of the people.”  
Enemies of the people included anyone who held non-communist ideals, and Japanese 
collaborators.  Kim Il-sung stripped them of any assets they had managed to hang on to 
throughout Japanese rule.66  Kim Il-sung reaped considerable propaganda value when 
the wealthy northern Koreans moved south, stating they were safe in the south and 
even protected by the United States military.67   
After the Second World War, throughout 1945 to 1948, the Soviet Union and the 
United States began to become suspicious of each other’s political ideals and foreign 
intentions.68  It was during post-war reconstruction period that the United States and the 
Soviet Union went from being allies to Cold War adversaries.69  Both countries were 
jockeying to promote their political visions of a post-war international order.  It was their 
differing visions of extreme social, political, and economic ideals that play out in their 
handling of Korea.  “The Soviet Union sought to expand its influence from Eastern 
Europe into North Korea, Central Asia, and the Middle East.  The United States wished 
to expand its influence from Western Europe to Latin America, Southeast Asia, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.”70  The Soviet Union moved in to occupy and rule 
North Korea with the same objectives they used in Europe to expand their ideals.71  
They consolidated North Korea into a left-wing government that emphasized socialism, 
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land reform, and independence from outside powers.  This was in contrast to South 
Korea’s transformation under the support of the United States, which promoted a 
capitalist government that was pro-Yangban class system, with largely Japanese-
trained officials.   
The Soviet Union’s occupation of North Korea alarmed the United States as they 
realized a Soviet occupation of Korea put communist forces dangerously near Japan.  
This realization brought a halt to United States reforms within Japan in 1947 and 1948, 
to focus on Japan’s economic recovery and political rehabilitation in order to build an 
allied country that would join forces against a communist threat.72  In this reversal, the 
United States turned from punishing Japanese leaders for their wartime atrocities to 
building a key cold war ally.73  Because the two political ideals of each occupied zone 
were so extreme, the merging of the two became difficult if not impossible; these 
differences led to eventual hardening of the 38th parallel.  Korea became an 
“unfortunate testing ground in the cold war.”74   
These divisions peaked when the United States decided to end its occupation 
prior to the end of the five-year trusteeship, to focus on Japan’s recovery.  In 1948, the 
United States gave The United Nations the task of creating a “free” Korea.  To 
accomplish this, The United Nations attempted to hold national elections throughout 
Korea.  North Korea viewed this as an act of aggression as South Korea had a larger 
population than the north, which weighed the election toward the right-wing candidates 
making the left wing a disadvantaged minority.  The northern government refused to 
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allow The United Nations to carry out elections in North Korea, and so the election went 
ahead only in the south.  The south elected Syngman Rhee as the first president of the 
“Republic of Korea (ROK).”  Rhee had ties with the United States, as he was educated 
there.75  The north left-wing assembly answered the United Nations elections by 
creating the “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK),” and appointing Kim Il-
sung as Supreme Leader.76  Once the DPRK was created, the Soviet Union withdrew 
from North Korea in December 1948, “leaving behind military advisors and a Soviet 
trained North Korean Army.”77  The United States withdrew the remainder of its troops in 
June 1949, leaving behind a small contingent of military advisors and an ill-equipped 
and equally ill-trained South Korean Army.78  
The Korean Civil War 
In North Korea, Kim Il-sung began planning to invade the south in an effort unify 
the country.79  Kim Il-sung repeatedly asked to the Soviet Union for permission to 
invade South Korea, and the Soviet Union agreed in 1950 as long as China agreed to 
support the war with resources.80  China did and “released 60,000 battle hardened 
Koreans from the People’s Liberation Army for duty in North Korea.”81  On June 25, 
1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and opened fire on South Korean 
troops.  Very quickly, North Korea troops captured most of South Korea except Pusan.  
At this point, the United States requested the United Nations support for the Republic of 
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Korea.82  The Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations and China was not yet a 
member at this point, so neither were present to veto the resolution to defend South 
Korea.  The Korean War lasted three years with an estimate of three million military and 
civilian dead.83  It created extensive economic and infrastructure damage, and both 
sides controlled the same amount of territory in the end.84  The armistice talks began in 
1951 but did not conclude until 1953.  The issue of what to do with prisoners of war was 
the main point of contention that prevented the countries from reaching an agreement 
earlier.  The United States wanted the prisoners to be able to choose whether they 
wished to go home, while China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union wanted the 
prisoners repatriated.85  When Stalin died, China and North Korea conceded on the 
issue and allowed the fighting to end without the two sides of Korea signing a Peace 
Treaty.86   
One legacy of the war was the result of the air superiority the United States 
displayed during the war and the lasting effects it had on North Korea.87  North Korea 
and Chinese air defenses were inadequate, and Stalin limited the Soviet Union’s air 
battles with the United States as he feared all out war between the two countries.88  
North Koreans lived in fear of aerial attacks and the possibility of atomic bombs for three 
years.  This fear left a deep and lasting psychological impact of weakness and 
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defenselessness.89  This fear of vulnerability to outside forces manifested into North 
Korea’s need to build up their antiaircraft defenses, underground installations, and 
nuclear weapons to ensure that they would not be defenseless again.90 
The other effect was the hardening of the divisional line between the north and 
the south.  The line moved from the 38th parallel to the cease-fire line.  South Korea 
took control of the eastern mountainous area north of the parallel, and North Korea 
claimed the western area south of the parallel line to include the city of Kaesŏng.91  The 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was formed by “pulling back the respective forces 1.2 miles” 
along each side of the cease-fire line.92  The DMZ houses the Joint Security Area in 
Panmunjom, where conferences between the two sides take place, as well as two 
villages that were allowed to stay in place after the Armistice Agreement; the North 
Korean Kijong-dong “Peace Village” remains vacant while the South Korea Daesung-
dong “Freedom Village” remains populated.93  The DMZ has become the most heavily 
fortified area on earth.  North Korea and South Korea have more than 1.7 million active 
duty troops with another 16 million reserve troops stationed near the DMZ.94  The DMZ 
was supposed to be a temporary boundary until the two Koreas could find a peaceful 
political solution for their unification; unfortunately, it has become a permanent division 
between two polarizing political ideals. 
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Legacies of Colonialism and the Civil War 
 
After liberation from the Japanese and during the Soviet occupation, Kim Il-
sung’s pursuit for leadership of the DPRK took almost a decade.  In 1948, he became 
the premier leader of the DPRK but he did not achieve the position of supreme leader of 
the DPRK until 1959.95  North Korea’s historical experiences and fears guided the 
formulation of Kim Il-sung’s policies in his quest to achieve the top leadership position.  
As the premier leader Kim Il-sung reverted to the highly isolationist policies of pre-
occupied Korea.96  He expanded his ruling circle and eliminated potential opponents, in 
an effort to do this Kim Il-sung establish the Songbun social classification in the late 
1940’s as a measure to combat the old Confucian feudal system that existed before and 
Japanese colonialism and to eliminate out anyone who benefited from or collaborated 
with the Japanese rule .  He created the Juch’e ideology policy, which arose from two 
desires that were present at the end of the Korean War.  The first developed from North 
Korea’s desire to form a unified Korea,97 the second from their fear of foreigners as they 
were viewed as a threat, their pride in surviving the Korean War and a determination to 
“avenge the national damage caused by the perceived western imperialism during the 
war.”98  Kim Il-sung was able to enforce his ideals and policies onto the people with the 
help of the “Workers’ Party of Korea.”99  The “Workers’ Party of Korea” (WPK) was 
constructed between 1945 and 1949 by merging the North Korean Branch Bureau, the 
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Korean Communist Party and the New Democratic Party,100 in which Kim Il-sung was 
appointed chairman.101 
The Role of Songbun 
The creation of the Songbun system formed after the old Yangban system social 
classification was assigned based on a person’s level of loyalty to Kim Il-sung regime.102  
In 1945, this reclassification system turned the social ranking of individuals upside 
down; peasants occupied the top of the caste ladder while those who were aristocrats 
and landlords fell to the bottom of the ladder.  This new classification allowed Kim Il-
sung to conduct the first round of purges, which consisted of Japanese supporters, 
merchants and landlords who benefited from the occupation.103  During the first year, 
the Songbun system was unofficial and only required background investigations for 
those seeking positions within the top ranks of the government.104  The Songbun 
system did not become official for everyone until 1957, when the “May 30th Resolution” 
was issued.105  This resolution allowed for the evaluation of the political background of 
every adult, which marked a turning point for the citizens of the DPRK.  The Songbun 
system separated the citizens into three categories:  the core, wavering, and hostile.  
The highest category was reserved for family members of guerrilla soldiers who fought 
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with Kim Il-sung, they were allowed to live in Pyongyang.106  The lowest classification 
fell on the former wealthy industrialist, alleged spies, Catholics, and Buddhists.  The 
“May 30th Resolution” resulted in a second wave of purges which were politically 
motivated, to include anyone that was viewed as a threat to Kim Il-sung’s government to 
include different political ideas, this purge lasted until 1958, and resulted in thousands of 
executions.107  Following the May 30th Resolution the government issued Decree No. 
149 dictating where members of the hostile class could reside, exiling thousands to the 
rural area of North Korea, where living conditions were difficult, far away from the capital 
Pyongyang, and the 38th parallel.108  Special settlements, which became prison camps, 
were created just for the exiles.109  In 1959, a German diplomat reported, “in recent 
times, the persecution of comrades who express a different opinion has been increased.  
They are being sent to rural areas, mines, hydropower dams and also into prison 
camps.”110  It was very hard for a person to raise their political status within the Songbun 
system, but very easy for a person to lose their political status.  The only factor that 
determined movement within the Songbun system is loyalty to the Kim regime.111  For 
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over 60 years, the Songbun system has played a major role in determining the main 
victims of the human rights violations within North Korea.112  
The Role of Juch’e in North Korean Policies 
Juch’e emerged from Marxist-Leninism and adapted to North Korean conditions, 
and was influenced by Maoism and Stalinism, promoting self-reliance and extreme 
nationalism.113  Kim Il-sung created the Juch’e ideals during the 1950s as a way to limit 
the Soviet Union’s influence over North Korea.114  In 1955 Kim Il-sung gave the “Juch’e 
speech,”115 officially declaring it as a policy and “by 1956 it had been adopted by the 
masses.”116  Kim Il-sung mimicked the Confucian way of placing a high value on 
studying in order to master its teachings, to promote Juch’e ideals.  Using this concept 
the DPRK government imposed rigorous and constant study sessions on all its citizens, 
young and old, of Kim Il-sung’s works, particularly those policies dealing with Juch’e.117  
Juch’e became part of North Korea’s 1972 constitution in Article 3, which stipulates that 
the government “shall make the Juch’e ideology the guiding principle for all its 
actions.”118  Kim Il-sung designed the Juch’e ideology to inspire the people to work hard 
to achieve true national independence from foreign aid and control.  The policy has 
influenced the actions of the North Korean government since the “1960s when the 
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ideology became a pillar of the North Korean State.”119  Kim Il-sung prohibited any other 
political ideologies, to be talk about or taught within North Korea.  Kim Il-sung used 
Juch’e to conduct another round of purges were he proceeded to remove Koreans with 
Soviet political sympathies and anyone he felt was imitating Soviet techniques in 
education and propaganda.120   
There are three governing principles of Juch’e: “Chaju,” domestic and foreign 
independence, “Charip,” economic independence and “Chawi,” military 
independence.121  Under the Chaju principle, North Korea earned the nickname “Hermit 
Kingdom” because of its mistrust of foreign countries.  This was in reference to the 
Korean Choson dynasty, which maintained a fifty-year history of keeping its distance 
from foreign nations.122  North Korea felt if they allowed foreign intervention, or pressure 
they could not maintain Chaju.  Kim Il-sung felt that political independence was crucial 
to economic stability and military self-defense.  The Charip principle promoted the need 
to build up a solid economic foundation to ensure political stability and maintaining a 
military defense.  The Chawi principle meant increasing the country’s defense 
capabilities in order to counter any perceived or real threat from foreign countries.  
“Kim’s conception of political organization was virtually synonymous with military 
organization and his understanding of the primary purpose of political organization was 
to constitute the entire able-bodied population as a permanently battle-prepared 
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national militia.”123  This belief ensured that the Chawi policy dominated the objectives 
of the government where in they put military defense programs first, at the expense of 
the North Korean citizens. 
The Role of the Worker’s Party of Korea 
 At the time of the Worker’s Party of Korea creation in 1946, there were 170,000 
members.124  The Worker’s Party of Korea was responsible for leading the people in 
defending and carrying forward Kim Il-sung’s Juch’e policies.  “The Worker’s Party of 
Korea (WPK), also known as the Korean Workers Party (KWP), is the only viable 
political party in North Korea.”125  It is responsible for all national policies and functions 
as the core of the North Korean Political system, and commands, as of 2002 grew to 
three million members.126  The original members of the party became the core of the 
North Korean Bureaucracy.127  “The party came to control all areas of daily life such as 
rationing of food, relocation, or employment.”128  By the 1950s, the state established “a 
vast surveillance network to monitor any expression of sentiments deemed anti-state or 
anti-revolutionary.”129  This extensive surveillance network was in place to monitor the 
North Korean citizens, in the form of the “Inminban” institute and the North Korean 
“organizational life.”130  North Korean citizens enjoyed very little freedom as the 
authorities began to monitor them, publically and privately.131   
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  The Inminban, or the people’s group, is a neighborhood watch system.132  The 
Neighborhood watch encompasses 20-40 households with a leader appointed to 
oversee all the households.  The leader is responsible for scrutinizing the intimate 
details of family life and to report to the police any behavior considered illegal or 
disloyal.133  Neighbors spied on neighbors, creating an elaborate surveillance network in 
which citizens were always on guard and living in fear.  “The population is encouraged 
to condemn any behavior that may pose a threat to the political system and its 
leadership, even a casual remarks shared in a small circle could end up being reported 
by informants, leading to serious consequences.”134  The duties of the leaders of the 
Inminban included monitoring strangers, maintaining the public’s health, and protecting 
facilities and infrastructures. 
The “organizational life” is consists of associations that the people are required to 
join and come under the supervision of the Workers’ Party of Korea.135  There are 
associations for every age, starting at the age of seven:136  
 Children’s Union is for the 7 to 13 years-olds  
 Kim Il-sung Socialist Youth League is for the 14 to 30 years-olds  
 After 30 years-old – it depended on their occupation and marital status.   
o General public 
 General Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
 Democratic Women’s Union 
 Union of Agricultural Working People,  
o Privileged few 
 Worker’s Party of Korea; these members would become officials of the mass 
associations.  
It was required to be a member of one of the associations until death.137  These 
associations served as a continued form of indoctrination in Kim philosophy.  With the 
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Songbun system, the Juch’e policies, and the support of the Worker’s party of Korea, 
Kim Il-sung was able to reconfigure the political structure of North Korea and eradicate 
all forms of opposition to insure his role as Supreme Ruler over North Korea. 
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Kim Dynasty 
Kim Il-sung came to power in 1946, with the support and loyalty of guerrilla 
fighters and the Soviet Union.  During the early years of power, Kim Il-sung created a 
closely controlled society by establishing the citizen surveillance networks to insure that 
the people learned to abide by the newly initiated Juch’e doctrine.  He served as 
Secretary General of the KWP and as President of North Korea.  Kim Il-sung used a 
highly personalized approach to running the DPRK in which he was involved in 
decision-making and governing processes.138  He used the Songban policy to 
conducted several purges between 1945 through 1960’s, to rid himself of all political 
opposition.  The first purge from 1945 to 1950 targeted anyone who benefited from or 
collaborated with the Japanese.  The second purge occurred from 1957 to 1958 and 
targeted political opposition, while promoting those most loyal to his regime.  The third 
purge happened in the 1960s, the targeted included anyone belonging to pro-Chinese, 
and pro-Soviet Union factions that threaten his regime and the policies he was 
promoting.139  Kim’s style of governing followed the “traditional isolationism system” that 
had been prominent in Korean history for hundreds of years prior to the Japanese 
invasion of 1876, and his incorporation of resisting outside influence came from his 
experiences during the Japanese colonization and the civil war.140  Kim’s regime also 
embodied “the Confucian tradition of absolute loyalty to an individual leader,” to bolster 
his control of the country141  While North Korea accepted aid from the Soviet Union and 
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China for decades to come, these countries did not have any political influence over 
Kim’s regime.  During the 1960s, Kim Il-sung created a Monolithic Ideology System 
known as the Suryong System.  He turned Juch’e into a religion, presenting himself as 
the Christ-like savior of North Korea further promoting his cult-like regime.  The Suryong 
System extended his power beyond the WPK, the administration and the military.142  It 
allowed him to take complete control of state planning and the economy.143  Kim Il-sung, 
and his descendents, are seen as bestowing benevolence on the people and in return, 
the people pledge their loyalty to the Kim regime.144   
Kim Jong-il emerged in the1970s with his appointment as director of the 
propaganda bureau of the KWP.145  This advancement solidified his claim as a possible 
heir to Kim Il-sung and brought about a struggle for succession between Kim Jong-il, 
and his uncle Kim Yong-ju.  Kim Jong-il received the backing of “the first generation 
revolutionaries, while Kim Yong-ju had experience within the DPRK government.”146  
With Kim Sung-ae out of contention the competition became about Kim Jong-il and Kim 
Yong-ju.  To help solidify his surety as heir Kim Jong-il lead the Fifth Party Congress, in 
1974, to proclaim that Juch’e was a monolithic ideology.  He established the “Ten 
Principles” of this monolithic governing system to center on Kim Il-sung-ism limiting 
everyone else from the power circle.”147  Their competition helped to elevate Kim Il-
sung’s personality cult further and led to incorporating a new concept called “absolution 
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of the Great Leader.”148  Kim Il-sung officially designated his son as heir apparent in 
1980, insuring Kim Jong-il’s succession.149   
His father groomed Kim Jong-il for at least a decade before coming to power.  
This lengthy grooming period gave Kim Jong-il time to remove many challengers prior to 
his takeover.150  In 1994, when Kim Il-sung died, Kim Jong-il became Chairman of the 
National Defense Commission (NDC) and the Supreme Commander of the North 
Korean Army.151  In 1997, Kim Jong-il became the General Secretary of the Korean 
Worker’s Party.152  In 1998, the constitution was revised the position of President was 
abolished.  Kim Il-sung was designated as the Eternal President and elevated Kim 
Jong-il as chairman of the National Defense Commission.153  The NDC has authority 
over national, military, and economic affairs.154  After a three-year mourning period the 
Supreme People’s Assembly formally elected Kim Jong-il as their leader.155  Kim Jong-il 
maintained rigid control over the citizens and continued the policies that his father 
employed.156  He blocked opposition, push the Juch’e ideology, maintained the 
elaborate spy network, and employed brute force.157  “He used perks and rewards to 
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win over military and elite members."158  In an effort to protect his leadership Kim Jong-il 
utilized three methods to try to prevent a coup: 159 
 choosing military leaders based on their loyalty and not competence 
 advancing relative to key positions  
 creating multiple, competing and overlapping internal security agencies 
This last measure worked to reduce the unity of security agencies, creating rivalries and 
mistrust within the organizations.  
In 1990s, Kim Jong-il instituted the “Military First” policy as another method to 
ensure regime survival.160  Kim Jong-Il inherited a country that was almost bankrupt, 
and was starting to suffer from the famine creating an environment of instablity.161  It is 
unclear if Kim Jong-il voluntarily instituted the military first policies in response to the 
economic and food crisis, or if the Military forced Kim Jong-il to give them control or if it 
had been a combination of both circumstances.162  The formation of this policy was to 
safeguard North Korea’s style of socialism under any circumstances.163  Kim Jong-Il 
ruling platform was “military first – workers second”164  In North Korea the nuclear 
weapon is considered a result of military-first politics and preserves state sovereignty. 
After his brain aneurysm,165 Kim Jong-il began preparing for his successor and 
officially named Kim Jong-un in June 2009.166  Kim Jong-un was the youngest of three 
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sons and Kim Jong-il’s favorite son.  Kim Jong-nam, the oldest, fell out of favor when he 
was caught trying to enter Japan with a forged passport.167  Kim Jong-il viewed Kim 
Jong-chol, the second son, as girlish and too weak to rule.168  Kim Jong-il helped to 
ensure a smooth transition of power by making fundamental changes to who held 
power.  He was able to orchestrated state policies to insure the National Defense 
Commission Chairman wield absolute power.169  The transfer of power happened 
quickly and efficiently in an attempt to stabilize the monolithic regime.170  Kim Jong-un 
was elected to chairman of the NDC in April 2012, during the next year Kim Jong-un 
transitions was marked by purges of potential a hostile officials and international 
provocations.171  Kim Jong-un has made it clear there will be no changes to the “Military 
First” policy and that all other policies enacted by his father and grandfather would 
continue.172   
Defense Strategies 
After the Korean War ended, North Korea was busy with reconstruction.  It was 
not until the sixties that North Korea started investing large amounts of its resources to 
build-up its military.173  The focus on the military came from the internationally tensions 
heightened during the 1960s.  It began with the “Park Chung Hee’s Military Coup,” in 
South Korea,  when Japan-South Korea began holding security talks and the Cuban 
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missile crisis occurred, Kim Il-sung viewed these events as security threats.174  In 
response, he instituted two extreme military policies in 1962: the “Four Military Lines” 
and the “Economy-Defense Parallel-Development Policy.”175   
The “Four Military Lines” was instrumental in instituting four policies: (1) to arm 
the entire population; (2) fortify the entire country: (3) train the entire army as a “cadre 
army,” a group of trained qualified personnel each capable of forming, training, or 
leading an expanded organization; (4) and modernize the military.176  The “Economy-
Defense Parallel-Development Policy” promoted military strength and efficiency to be 
equally as important as the economy and heavy industry.177  When Kim Jong-il became 
leader, he made the military highest priority over economy and industry.178  Military 
doctrine was refined further to incorporate the concepts of “combined operations” and 
“two-front war.”179  Combine operations called for the integration of guerrilla warfare 
operations with conventional ground forces.  The “two-front war” the first front 
traditionally was with South Korea along the DMZ, the second front the rear area of 
Korea or the rest of the world.180  It i estimated that 40% of the population serve in some 
form of military capacity and are able to mobilize easily for war.181  These new military 
policies increased military expenses from 5.8% in 1964 to 31% in 1970.182   
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 North Korea argues that the economy can recover from collapse; however, the 
collapse of the military would crumble the entire country.183  The following chart 
indicates how much North Korea allocated to defense spending from 1991 to 2005:184
 
Since the mid-1960s North Korea has imposed a “statistical blackout” and has 
not officially released any data on their economy, military or weapons defenses, 
agriculturally or social.185  Without enough data, it is hard to compare how much North 
Korea spent on agricultural needs during the same time impossible.186   
 The military first policy allows the military to decide how to allocate scare 
resources.  It is unknown to the outside world when North Korea began its nuclear 
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program.187  North Koreas officially acknowledge the birth of the nuclear program began 
in 1952 with the establishment of the Atomic Energy Research Institute.188  In 1959, 
North Korea and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy.189  North Korea began to branch out in their nuclear capabilities and in the 
1980s became capable in producing nuclear weapons.190   
North Korea’s nuclear advancements have caused concern for international 
countries, and have become the focal point of international talks.  In December 1985, 
North Korea accepted the opportunity to become a party to the “Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).”191  In December 1991, North and South Korea 
agreed to ban nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula.192  By 1992, there was 
growing evidence that North Korea was converting nuclear energy waster into weapons 
grade plutonium while negotiations were ongoing to sign the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) accords.193  The IAEA confirmed, in 1993, that North Korea’s 
reprocessing process was more advanced than North Korea acknowledged.194  In June 
1994, North Korea withdrew from the IAEA and threatened to turn its nuclear fuel into 
bombs.195  President Carter, a trained naval nuclear engineer,196 negotiated with Kim Il-
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sung striking a deal to avert confrontation.197  Oct 1994, the United States and North 
Korea sign “Agreed Framework” pact, the United States agreed to supply North Korea 
with light-water reactors, which created small amounts of weapons-grade plutonium.198  
North Korea agreed to freeze and dismantle their nuclear processing plant and allow 
international experts to inspect their military sites.  In 1998, the international community 
suspected North Korea of having an underground nuclear facility.199  North Korea 
showed the world what its missile program was capable of when it launched a three-
stage space launcher over Japan in 1998.200  According to North Korea, it released a 
satellite that orbited the Earth 100 times.201   
In 2002, North Korea admitted to violating its 1994 Agreement Framework Pact 
and declared the agreement nullified.202  The Six-Party talks began in 2003 between 
North and South Korea, China, Russia, Japan and the United States.203  Their aim was 
to end North Korea’s nuclear program through negotiations.  After two sessions, North 
Korea agreed to end its nuclear weapons program in return for security, economic and 
energy benefits in 2005.204  North Korea admitted to conducting its first nuclear test in 
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October 2006.205  Six nation talks resumed in 2006 coming to an agreement in 2007 
that North Korea would disable its nuclear facilities and allow nuclear inspectors into the 
country, in exchanged for $400 million in fuel oil and aid.206  By 2008 North Korea 
resumed plutonium reprocessing, after charging that the United States has not fulfilled 
its promise of removing North Korea from a list of state sponsors of terrorism.207  In 
2009, North Korea ended its participation after continued missile testing violated the 
agreement it made.208   
Over the years, North Korea has employed a negotiating strategy with foreign 
countries that follow the pattern of “Demand, Offer, and Threat.”209  The DPRK has set 
by a core set of demands that have been prevalent since the first nuclear crisis in 1993, 
such as ending United States sanctions, normalizing relations, and building a strategic 
relationship, acquiring economic aid or compensation for concessions.210  North Korea 
offers to stand down to alleviate the international community’s fears and while promising 
to take affirmative steps to “resolve all security concerns, by suspending, ending, or 
dismantling its nuclear and/or missile programs.”211  The threat consists of the 
punishments or the consequences for not meeting the conditions of their offer.  Thus a 
clear pattern has emerged; the DPRK has conducted provocation maneuvers, from 
attacking South Korea vessels, shots fired in the DMZ, to escalating tensions by 
threatening nuclear war to begin negotiations, all in an effort to secure political and 
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economical compensation.212  The DPRK’s reliance on the threat controls international 
negotiations, leaving little room for discussion concerning human rights violations.213   
When Kim Jong-un became ruler, he continued these tactics of negotiation.  On 
March 31, 2013, during the Central Committee assembly, Kim Jong-un said, “Nuclear 
weapons guarantee peace, economic prosperity, and people’s happy life.”214  During the 
same assembly, Kim Jong-un is supposed to have adopted the Pyongjin Line, a 
strategic course of building the economy and nuclear program simultaneously.215  
Currently there is not enough evidence to evaluate if this is rhetoric or if this is an 
enacted policy. 
Economy 
Initially after the World War II, Kim Il-sung did not have to make many economic 
changes.  At the time of the division of Korea, the north controlled 76% of the 
peninsula’s mining production, 92% of its electrical generating capability, and 80% of its 
heavy industrial facilities, leaving the South Korea with the majority of the rice 
production.  Kim Il-sung’s goal was to create a self-reliant national economy, believing it 
was a prerequisite for political independence.  To achieve this Kim Il-sung devised a 
strategy to prioritize heavy industry similar in manner as Stalin had done in the Soviet 
Union.216  He focused on light industry and agriculture to coincide with the heavy 
industrial development.  “In 1946 North Korean authorities distributed 1 million hectares 
of farmland to landless peasants to increase agriculture and began the process of 
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nationalizing industry.”217  North Korea established a stable economy before the Korean 
War.  During the Korean War, the region suffered extensive structural damage, due to 
three years of aerial bombardments.  According to damage assessments done by the 
United States Air Force, “eighteen of the twenty-two major cities in North Korea had 
been obliterated to half their size.”218  In addition, the bombardments destroyed 
hundreds of thousands of acres of farmland, industrial and transportation 
infrastructures.219   
After the Korean War, North Korea rebuilt their country and economy relying 
heavily on the Soviet Union and China for economic and military support and substantial 
aid came in the form of labor, materials, reconstruction and building plants, and 
technology transfers.220  China provided thirty-four divisions of soldiers as free labor; 
each division held a minimum of ten thousand soldiers, these soldiers remained in North 
Korea until 1958.221  Initially North Korea was able to revive their economy until the 
1960s when its economy became stagnant. North Korea went through many 
construction and economic campaigns through 1954 to 1993, in conjunction with these 
campaigns, Kim Il-sung instituted mass mobilization movements.  These movements 
consist of utilizing every potential laborer; women were assigned to light industry, 
soldiers were assigned to industrial or construction projects and prisoners performed 
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industrial labor.222  Workers were encouraged to compete in order to increase 
production.  As the chart below shows mass mobilization and foreign aid helped North 
Korea’s economy peaked during 1957 through 1961.   
Economic plans Official Results   223   
   Post-War Construction Plan 
(1954-1956) 
Gross industrial production of 
1955:    
56% higher than 1949 
Five-Year Economic Plan Annual industrial growth rate:         46.3% 1957-1959 
(1957-1961) Industrial production of 1960:    3.5 times larger than in 
1956 
First Seven-Year Economic 
Plan 
(1961-1967) 
Extended to 1970; 
Annual industrial growth rate:         
                                                   
 
18% (original goal) 
12.8% (official growth 
rate) 
Six-Year Economic Plan 
(1971-1976) 
Annual industrial growth rate:      
                                                    
14% official goal  
16.3% official growth rate 
Second Seven-Year Economic 
Plan 
(1978-1984) 
Re-adjustment period (1985-
1986) 
Annual industrial growth rate:         
                                                   
12.1% official goal 
12.2% official growth rate 
Third Seven-Year Economic 
Plan 
(1987-1993) 
Re-adjustment period (1994-
1996) 
Annual industrial growth rate:        
10% official goal  
 No official growth rate 
 Tensions were rising between the socialist countries in the 1960s, when tensions 
between China and the Soviet Union reached a climax and the smaller socialist 
countries had to choose sides.224  North Korea’s tension with the Soviet Union 
happened when they sided with China, resulting in the Soviet Union withholding aid in 
the early 1960s.225   Relations between the two countries would recover to some extent 
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by 1965 aid from the Soviet Union resumed, between 1965 to 1968 Soviet aid 
expanded.226 
In the late 1960s into the 1970s, several factors contributed to a further decline 
North Korea’s decline in economic development:  
 There was a shortfall of consumer goods. 
 The use of massive amounts of resources on lavishly constructed gigantic monuments. 
 Increased military defense spending.   
North Korea was still upholding the heavy industry priority, failing to produce enough 
consumer goods.  Massive amounts of resources were used to build the great statue of 
Kim Il-sung, the museum of Korean Revolution, and the Tower of Juch’e, in an effort to 
express loyalty to the Kim regime and its political ideals.  In but when the economy 
declined, the worked stopped.227  The budget for military expenses increased 
significantly to support the 1960s from 5.8% in 1964, to 31% in 1970, in response to the 
new perceived international threat.228   
Further economic strains came from the creation of the Suryong economic 
system, the appointment of Kim Jong-il as heir apparent and the campaign to diversify 
their trade routes by reaching out the Western countries.229  “The Suryong political 
system established an economy that consisted of two parts: the Party-economy and the 
Second economy.  The Party economy revolved around the upper classes, and the 
regime.  The Second economy acquired funds for North Korea’s military and managed 
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revenues earned via weapons exports.230  “The designation of Kim Jong-il as Kim Il-
sung’s successor made it necessary to prepare political funds for the cause.”231  Kim 
Jong-il began a glorification project of his father’s rule.  In order to sway the military, the 
elite, and the political agencies, Kim Jon-il needed funding to provide luxury goods to 
reward loyalty.232   
In an effort to revitalize the sluggish economy, in an effort to offset these new 
economic needs.  North Korea set about trying to entice Western capital investments in 
the form of loans and technologies.233  This venture would yield nearly $600 million 
dollars worth of loans and contracts between 1970 and 1975 with Japan and Western 
European Countries.”234  These contracts were for the trade of resources, factories, and 
technologies to produce raw materials.  By 1973, its trade with the European Economic 
Community exceeded its trade with other socialist countries.235  The DPRK planned to 
use the investments to restore the industries to production level, and use the revenues 
to pay off the reconstruction period debt.  This was not to happen, their economy was 
not designed to receive foreign capital, and their industries had difficulties incorporating 
Western equipment.236  In 1973, the world experience and a global oil crisis caused by 
international oil prices rising.  The DPRK diverted revenues earned from these contracts 
to pay for the higher cost, resulting in their inability to repay the international loans their 
secured.  By 1974, the DPRK could no longer pay for Western resources or 
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technologies, and their foreign debt payments stopped in the 1980s.  North Korea was 
the first communist country to default on its debts to the West.237  Their default resulted 
in an “imposed isolation by the international community” resulting in then the north’s 
economy slowing down and lagging behind South Korea’s economy.”238   
During the 1980s, North Korea continued to experience economic problems.  
Both the Soviet Union and China moved to market economies,239 North Korea could no 
longer trade labor for energy and materials they were now required to pay for it.240  The 
DPRK could no longer pay to import the raw materials needed to carry out its 
agricultural plans.241  It became apparent that there were limitations with North Korea’s 
closed economy.242  North Korea’s pursuit of a self-reliant economy continued to hinder 
economic growth and technological progress.  In 1984, the government attempted to fix 
the economy by increasing production of consumer goods.243  The state did not change 
its heavy industry priority policies, creating a lack of the materials needed to increase 
production of consumer goods, impeding the success of the campaign.  In addition to 
the lack of materials, the international community expected North Korea to repay its 
debt by 1985, which had reached $5.2 billion dollars.244   
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In 1985, in an effort to generate international currency, they instituted a second 
economic campaign.245  The state instituted the “Joint Venture Law” in order to attract 
Western capital, technology, and expertise.246  This marked the first time North Korea 
had invited outside capital into the country.247  There were three groups of investment 
types:248 
 Equity joint ventures – North Korea and Foreign Investors invest jointly, operate 
the business jointly, it is a limited liability corporations, and profits are distributed 
according to their investment shares. 
 Contractual joint venture – North Korea and Foreign Investors invest jointly, only 
North Korea manages the operations, profits are distributes according to their 
investment shares, and when the contract term is over the company transfers to 
the host country. 
 Foreign-owned venture – Foreign investor owns and exclusively operates the 
corporation, North Korean authorities heavily regulate these corporations, and 
they are only allowed to operate in the Free Economic Trade Zones. 
 
This campaign plan failed as only 53 companies concluded investment contracts from 
1985 to 1989.249  Most of these investors were former Koreans living in Japan or the 
United States.  Commercial infrastructure was lacking and the foreign companies ran 
into problems due to DPRK political interference and lack of transparency from the 
government.250  Purchases within the zones were restricted to hard currency spenders, 
foreign diplomats and privileged North Koreans.251  Between the limited buyers and the 
party’s interference with management and bureaucratic red tape, the companies were 
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not successful.  In 1987, North Korea initiated yet another economic campaign.  North 
Korea decided to hold the “13th World Festival of Youth and Students,” in 1989.  This 
was in response to the Seoul Olympics in 1988.  The money spent staging the festival 
dealt and already weak economy a serious blow.252  In 1991 after the failure of the 
festival, influenced by China’s success with the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), The 
DPRK created their own SEZs in an effort to bring in international capital.253  These 
SEZs operated as a tourist area, an industrial complex, or a port open for use by China 
and the Soviet Union.   
When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s, their aid dropped 
significantly from $2.56 billion in 1990 to $1.4 million in 1994.254  The DPRK turned to 
China for additional assistance, but China did not give as much as North Korea received 
from the Soviet Union.  Bilateral trade with China fell from $900 million in 1993 to $550 
million in 1995, while food exports fell by half between 1993 and 1994.255  When Kim 
Jong-il took over as leader in 1994, the economy had weakened to the extent that the 
government could not provide for the basic needs to the people.256  In response, Kim 
Jong-il instituted the “Two Meal a Day” campaign.  By the end of the 1990s, two meals a 
day had become an impossible dream for many North Koreans.  It was during this time 
the North Korea turned to drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering, and 
exporting weapons to the Middle East, in an effort to generate the money needed to 
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continue to fund the government and the military. 257   In the 2000s, the DPRK included 
counterfeit cigarettes and pharmaceuticals to its list of illegal activities.258 
It is difficult to pin point how much revenue is generated by these illicit economic 
routes since by their very nature illegal activities are disguised.  In 2008, the UN report 
stated it estimated the revenue from illegal activities has generated as much as $500 
million a year, a third of the DPRK’s annual exports.259  These figures are hard to 
substantiate, as North Korea does not officially release economic data.  These revenue 
channels received increased scrutiny from the international countries after the nuclear 
crisis of 2002.  North Korea’s alternative economic routes became targets for 
sanctions.260  In response to the nuclear crisis, international countries have instituted 
embargos and sanctions to curb trade with North Korea.261  International countries 
imposed “sanctions on military and technological materials, luxury goods, as well as 
freezing North Koreas financial assets with the exception of funds necessary to meet 
basic needs.”262  The sanctions did not prevent North Korea from acquiring the items 
wanted. 
Since Kim Jong-un’s ascension to power there has been a lot of speculation 
about the changes he would make.  After his ascension, there was a renewed focus on 
the economy and a push to once again draw foreign investments and trade to the 
country.263  It was rumored that agricultural reforms were being put into place, in an 
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effort to increase harvests and easing the suffering of the people.264  With limited 
information coming out of North Korea, these rumors are hard to confirm.  North Korea 
remains very dependent on China for its economic stability, yet resents this 
dependency.  The DPRK fears China could use this dependency to limit or control its 
nuclear program.265  Efforts are underway to diversify away from China as North Korea 
tries to rebuild relations with Russia.  A possibility of renewed relations was prompted 
by Russia’s agreement to write off almost $10 billion dollars of North Korea’s Soviet era 
debt in 2014, allowing the country to pay off the remaining $1.09 billion over the next 
twenty years.266  It remains to be seen if this new relationship will amount to anything 
substantial that would allow North Korea to diminish their dependency on China.   
Sanctions 
North Korea’s economic structure is widespread with faults and shortcomings.  
While the spending associated with Juch’e policy of military is certainly a big reason for 
the country’s economic crisis, many believe the sanctions that North Korea has suffered 
since the Korean War have been counterproductive to economic reforms.267  On 
December 19, 1950 three days after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman 
invoked the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, prohibiting all trade with North 
Korea.268  The United States amended the Export Control Act of 1949, adding the 
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“Cannon Amendment.”269  The Cannon Amendment can only be applied when United 
States troops fight under the command of the United Nations.  In this scenario, the 
United States used this new amendment to halt trade instituting a complete embargo on 
exports with North Korea.270  These initial sanctions against North Korea were not lifted 
until 2008 when President Bush determined that the sanctions put in place during the 
Korean War no longer serve our national interest.271    
Since the Korean War, sanctions against North Korea in an effort halt their 
Nuclear and missile programs.  There are common misconceptions revolving around 
sanctions enacted against North Korea, the three statements are usually stated in news 
media:272 
a. North Korea is the most heavily sanctioned country in the world.  
b. Sanctions cannot affect an isolated country like North Korea.  
c. There is nothing left to sanction in North Korea. 
The first misconception is easy to dispute; the United States, European Union, and The 
United Nations have all imposed more sanctions against Iran, than they have on North 
Korea.  The United States has targeted Zimbabwe, Congo, and Burma for human rights 
violations, yet has taken no action against North Korea since the “United Nations 
Commission of Inquiry” came out in 2014, citing crimes against humanity.273  The 
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following chart compares the number of sanctions enacted agains North Korea verses 
Iran:274 
 
The second myth is harder to prove or disprove, it is well known that North Korea 
suffers from economic and agricultural problems, what is hard to prove is how the 
sanctions made these problems worse.  The regime is able to acquire the money it 
needs to cover luxury items and sanctions have not stopped North Korea from 
continually fulfilling their Military First Policies and violating the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.  
In regards to the third myth it is more about enforcing the current sanctions than 
imposing new sanctions.  The Kim regime has used many ways to continue to develop 
weapons programs, obtain currency, and strengthen the elites’ allegiance.  Kim Jong-
un, as his father before him, uses luxury goods to gain favor with the elite’s loyalties.  
The luxury items are acquired through third party countries, as long as they have the 
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money to purchase them.  It has become apparent to the international community how 
dependent the Kim regime has become on these items to maintain stability and further 
is political objectives.275  “Based on statistics collected from Chinese customs data by 
South Korea’s intelligence services state that since Kim Jong-un’s succession, 
expenditures for luxury goods have increased from $446 million in 2010 to $644 million 
in 2012, an amount six times greater than what was spent on importing food for its 
hungry.”276   
 
 The sanctions that are currently in place are not enforced by many countries, it 
is easy to blame China, but they are not the only country ignoring sanctions against 
North Korea.  Dozens of European based companies continue to sell items or invest in 
North Korean companies, as have Middle Eastern countries.277  The fact is North Korea 
owns a WMD program, and could respond violently to hard line sanctions, this prevents 
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the international community from initiating them.  The other fact is China holds UN veto 
power, and would use it to prevent UN hard-line sanctions.  North Korea is not going to 
back down on its nuclear programs as the program ensures its continued existence.278  
It is believed that if China were to start enforcing the sanctions against North Korea, the 
country may be more willing to negotiate.279  “China is reluctant to be too harsh on North 
Korea for fear that the regime would collapse and destabilize the region.”280   
“Since 2006, The United Nations has passed five sanction resolutions against 
North Korea (1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094). These resolutions prohibit North Korea 
from possessing and trafficking in WMD technology, from importing luxury goods, and 
from importing or exporting most weapons, along with related materiel or services.”281  
All of these sanctions were in response to North Korea’s weapons programs.  None of 
the sanctions could be “directed toward humanitarian and diplomatic activities or 
developmental programs addressing the needs of the civilian population.”282  The 
enforcement of sanctions depends of the agreement of the U.N. Security Council 
Members to interpret them and on the member states to enforce them.283   
 When North Korea creates, a nuclear crisis the international community responds 
with sanctions aiming to curb the nuclear threat or give in by supplying aid.  North Korea 
has carved out a unique position in the international world, international countries fear 
                                                          
278 Jacques L. Fuqua, Nuclear Endgame: The Need for Engagement with North Korea (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security 
International, 2007), 12. 
279 Colum Lynch, "Is there anything left to sanction in North Korea?," Foreign Policy, last modified February 13, 2013, accessed 
November 27, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/13/is-there-anything-left-to-sanction-in-north-korea/. 
280 Denise Youngblood Coleman, Ph.D, ed., North Korea 2015 Country Review (Houston, TX: Country Watch, 2015), 142, PDF. 
281 Stanton, "North Korea: The Myth," Fletcher Security Review. 
282 Ibid 
283 Francesco Giumelli, "How EU sanctions work: a new narrative," The European Union Institute for Security Studies, last modified 
May 2013, accessed November 27, 2015, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_129.pdf. 
55 
 
pushing North Korea too far as it may result in a war.  This fear leaves the DPRK 
insulated from accountable for its actions.  Between U.N. bureaucracy and poor 
enforcement by the member states, U.N. Sanctions have slowed North Korean WMD 
programs but not stopped them.284  Nor have these sanctions influenced the DPRK to 
turn its attention away from its military first policy to take care of its citizens.  With all 
these sanctions in place, not one is used to protect the North Korean people from 
human rights abuses by the DPRK. 
China 
China plays a critical role in enabling the Kim regime and the DPRK to survive 
and facilitate the countries human rights abuses.  China is one of the five founding 
members of the UN who hold veto power and they are North Korea’s strongest ally 
within the UN.  China has a rocky relationship with North Korea, on one hand, they have 
been North Korea’s biggest ally, their biggest trading partner, biggest financial and 
resource supporter since the Korean War.285  North Korea imports from China are 85% 
and 75% of their exports go into China.286  Based on several treaties that China has 
with North Korea, they actively monitor the border and forcibly return captured North 
Korean escapees.  The DPRK has never been as dependent on another country as it is 
currently on China, and is increasingly resentful of its dependency on China.  The 
DPRK perceives that this dependency gives China an advantage over North Korea.  
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The belief is that North Korea would like to develop relationships with the other Six-
Party members, to move away from its dependency on China.287 
On the other hand, when North Korea performed its first nuclear weapons test in 
2006 a strain of the relationship began to materialize.288  During the crisis China 
disagreed with the United States hard line policy towards North Korea, believing it would 
push them to accelerate the nuclear program instead of abandoning the program.289  
China used its influence to persuade the United States and Japan to provide economic 
incentives in return for North Korea’s concessions on its nuclear program.290  It is in 
China’s best interest to preserve peace and stability in the peninsula.  It balances the 
goal is to denuclearize North Korea and prevent a dangerous chain reaction in the 
region while continuing its specific relationship with North Korea.291  North Korea’s 
nuclear program is viewed as a liability to China’s national interest as it fears North 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions could incite an arms race in the region.292  China’s main 
priority is to maintain stability within North Korea; preferring status quo to the prospect 
of a collapse which would send refugees flooding over the Chinese- North Korean 
border.293  If North Korea provokes a war, China, the United States and South Korea be 
major players in the confrontation, a position the three countries do not want.  China 
receives praise for signing the U.N. Resolution 1718, yet China would not agree to sign 
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the resolution until the tough economic sanctions were removed leaving on only the 
luxury goods sanctions in place.294  If the concessions were not made, China would 
have used its veto power to scrap the entire bill.  China has positioned itself into a 
peculiar place; it simultaneously asserts its relationship with North Korea while denying 
responsibility to influence its actions.295  China benefits by its offers to mediate to end 
North Korea confrontations in return for political concessions, but will not use its 
influence to deter North Korea from its nuclear program or discuss human rights 
abuses.296  This tactic can only last so long before the international community expects 
China to assert its influence over North Korea or step aside.  China would prefer to see 
a unified Korea that practiced similar political ideals as China.  In the case of a collapse, 
China has suggested that it would take control of Pyongyang and control the northern 
portion of the Korea Peninsula.297  It does not want the United States, via South Korea, 
to gain control of the entire peninsula.   
The UN’s report implicated China in facilitating North Korea’s crimes against 
humanity.298  “China is party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, which gives the 
sovereign states the discretion in establishing processes for evaluation of refugee 
claims within their own legal systems.”299  In spite of the agreement, China currently 
does not have a national refugee system to determine refugee status.  China views 
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North Koreans who crossed the border as illegal immigrants.300  It is in this belief that 
China maintains its repatriation of North Korean escapees does not go against 
international law as the repatriation upholds its bilateral treaty obligations made with the 
DPRK.301  China claims to have three treaties with North Korea: (1) Escaped Criminals 
Reciprocal Extradition Treaty, a secret agreement made in the early 1960’s, stipulating 
that any North Koreans that illegally cross the North Korea-China border must be 
returned as criminals.302  (2) 1964 Protocol between the PRC Ministry of Public Security 
and the DPRK Social Safety Ministry for Mutual Cooperation in Safeguarding National 
Security and Social Order in Boarder Areas, describes mutual obligations regarding 
border control and repatriation of criminals.  Article 4 of the Protocol states that both 
sides will prevent illegal border crossings and that “Illegal border crossers will be 
returned to the other side.”303  (3) “1986 Protocol called for further cooperation to 
prevent illegal border crossings as well as mutual extradition concerning defecting 
criminals.”304   
In 2000, it is estimated that 30,000 to 300,000 North Koreas escaped and 
crossed the border into China.305  Over the last two decades, China has forcibly 
returned tens of thousands of these escapees back to North Korean.  On occasion, they 
have also arrested and imprisoned anyone helping or sheltering illegal immigrants, this 
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includes NGO activists for attempting to help North Koreans to reach South Korea.306  
China asserts that forced repatriation is essential to maintaining national security, social 
order, and border controls.307  Once returned the escapees are sent to the political 
prison camps were they are subjected to torture, rape, starvation, and possible 
execution.308   
It is because of this forced repartition that the United Nations of Inquiry (COI) has 
implicated China in North Korea’s crimes against humanity.  China claims that the they 
are honoring the treaties in place and that the migrants they return to North Korea are 
not punished.309  During the COIs investigation, China denied the COI access to its 
border area to question the migrants to determine if they meet the criteria for protection 
under political refugee status.310  When the COI findings were published, China stated 
that the charges were “divorced from reality” because the investigators had not visited 
the border area.311  The UNs report does not specifically mention China in its 
allegations; it is referred to as the neighboring country.  The UN treaty bodies have 
called on China directly to cease its practice of forcibly repatriating North Koreas, to no 
avail.312   
While China continues to criticize North Korea’s nuclear program, it stands 
behind North Korea when it criticizes the UN report charging North Korea with human 
rights violation.  The Chinese are not likely to change their policies concerning North 
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Korean escapees as officials view the North Korean refugees as economic illegal 
immigrants undermining Chinese border control, and should forcibly be repatriate back 
to North Korea.313  China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Hong Lei stated that: 
“Human rights issues shall not be politicized or be used to pressurize other 
countries.”  He added that China does not believe human rights issues should be 
discussed by the UN Security Council or taken up by the ICC.  “The referral of 
human rights issues to the International Criminal Court is not conducive to their 
resolution,” Hong said.  China’s position on the UN Security Council will keep 
North Korea from ever facing prosecution from the ICC.”314 
This statement is an indication where China’s political position on repatriation and other 
human rights abuses stands.  China would likely veto any decision to refer North Korea 
to the ICC, to face judgment for their human rights violations.   
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UN Report Human rights abuses 
 “On November 18, 2014, The United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly endorsed 
a recent U.N. Commission of Inquiry (COIs) report detailing crimes against humanity in 
North Korea and requested that the Security Council discuss the report and consider an 
International Criminal Court (ICC) referral.”315  The “Report of The Detailed Findings of 
The Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic Of 
Korea” listing the following violations committed by the DPRK:316 
 right to food, life 
 crimes associated with prison camps 
 Torture and inhuman treatment; Arbitrary arrest and detention, execution 
 Discrimination,  
 Violations of freedom of expression, freedom of individual movement, refuges 
and asylum seekers  
The COI determined that the North Korean Government was responsible for 
committing systematic human rights abuses on a scale without parallel in the 
contemporary world.317  The report was published after a yearlong inquiry that included 
testimonies from 240 North Korean exiles.318  The exiled North Koreans testified 
confidentially, as they feared the DPRK would retaliate against their families still located 
in North Korea.319  They believe the North Korea government continues to monitor their 
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every move.320  In 2014, Yeonmi Park a defector from North Korea, living in Seoul, tells 
how the Seoul police informed her that the North Korean government was watching her 
and her mother, giving credibility to their fear.321  The U.N. state members voted to 
discuss the report and to consider referring it to the ICC.  To date the state members 
have not referred the report to the ICC.  
After the report was filed with The United Nations, Ivan Simonovic the Assistant 
Secretary-General for Human Rights, stated, “Rarely has such an extensive charge-
sheet of international crimes been brought to this Council’s attention.”322  He equated 
the human rights abuses of North Koreans, to the treatment the Korean people 
experienced during the Second World War at the hands of the Japanese.  He 
proceeded to chastise the international community for focusing on military and nuclear 
priorities at the expense of economic and social rights as well as the lives and well-
being of the North Korean people.323 
In 1991, both North and South Korea became members of The United Nations.324  
Since then the DPRK has ratified several international treaties it has violated daily.  
North Korea ratified “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 
1981.”325  “The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
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(ICESCR) was ratified in 1981.”326  “The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
was ratified in 1990.”327  “The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) was ratified in 2001.”328  Documentation of the 
listed abuses dates to as early as 1979, prior to membership of the United Nations and 
their treaty ratifications.  From 2003 to 2011, the General Assembly made annual 
resolutions condemning the DPRK’s human rights record, with no further action taken, 
allowing the North Korean government to continue committing the violations.329 
Food shortage 
The DPRK had a policy to ensure food security through self-sufficiency, to 
ensure this they began expanding cropland, shifting traditional food crops such as 
potatoes, millet, and tubers to higher-yield grains namely rice, and corn.330  North Korea 
began the Public Distribution System (PDS) in 1950s, to distribute food to the Korean 
people.331  The PDS collected the harvest from all the collective farms minus the 
portions the farmers needed for their own consumption.332  Then the organization 
allocated the food to the provinces, each province was responsible for making sure the 
people in their area receive food.333  Those most loyal received more favorable rations 
than those viewed as hostile.334  The chart below shows how many grams were allotted 
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per person per day, and that the PDS progressively failed to meet its ration targets even 
before the famine and organizations collapse in the 1990s.335 
Norm 
Ration for Official 
Worker 
1955 Basic Formula from 900 grams of daily rations for 
heavy industrial workers to 300 grams for children 
700 grams per day 
256 kg per year 
1973 Deduction of four days rations from monthly 
 rations for so-called "war-time grain reserves"  
(average 13% deduction) 
608 grams per day 
222 kg per year 
1987 10% deduction for so-called "patriotic grain" 547 grams per day 
200 kg per year 
1992 10% deduction from adult rations 492 grams per day 
179 kg per day 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the government started focusing “on the use of chemical 
fertilizers in the agricultural process.”336  They also incorporated the use of “double 
cropping, and triple seedlings to give the perceived sense of improving the environment 
while also increasing agriculture development.”337  The DPRK adopted an industrial 
approach to agricultural production by integrating “mechanization, chemical fertilizers 
and pesticides, irrigation, and electrification.”338  Unfortunately, the agricultural 
conditions in the DPRK were not favorable for producing crops and it did not have the 
industrial components necessary for the type of agriculture it was trying to achieve.339   
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The DPRK relied on the socialist-style barter trade with the Soviet Union and 
China to acquire the raw materials needed to subsidize their agricultural productivity.340  
“Socialist-style barter trade” is based on usage value.  Goods and services are 
produced for their usefulness and not to generate profit.341  North Korea provided 
laborers to the Soviet Union in exchange for aid and as a way to pay off debts.342  
Despite its claims to self-reliance, North Korea was very dependent on outside 
assistance for raw materials.343  This would become a problem in the 1980s, when the 
Soviet Union and China moved to a market economy.  North Korea could not pay for the 
raw materials it needed to carry out its agricultural plans.344  Lack of resources hindered 
North Koreas ability to generate the materials needed to create its chemical fertilizer, 
leading to a decline in food production.345 
The starvation period in North Korea began at the end of the 1980s, in the early 
1990s the DPRK launched the “Let’s eat two meals a day” campaign as a way to ease 
in further ration cuts.346  The reports and the numbers counter the claims made by North 
Korea that the 1995 floods are the main cause of their food crisis.  By 1996, wild food 
accounted for 30% of the populations’ diet,347 1997 the PDS was only supplying rations 
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to 6% of the population.348  Violating the countries own constitution Article 25 (3) that 
declares, “The state provides all the working people with every condition for obtaining 
food, clothing, and housing.”349   
The PDS shut down in 1998, and the government told the people that the 
families were required to obtain food themselves and could no longer rely on the 
government.350  People were abandoned to find their own coping mechanisms to avoid 
starvation.  “Farmers markets” spontaneously appeared, collective farms began using 
their rice to purchase a variety of food from the famers markets.  This was the first time 
the people actively went against the government, as owning a private business was a 
political crime.351  As the food shortage persisted food markets became tolerated and 
then legal in 2002.352  The South Korean Ministry of Unification estimates that ordinary 
citizens obtain 60% of their food from these informal markets.353  In 2005, the DPRK 
tried to revive the PDS while doing an about face on the informal markets and making 
them illegal again.354  The government made it clear they would now be handing out 
rations again, the planned a target ration of 573 grams per person per day (PPPD).355  
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The World Food Programme (WFP) allots half a kilogram or 500 grams of food per day 
per person.356  “Less than a quarter of PDS dependent households, which is about 65% 
to 70% of the Korean population, and two-thirds of farmers received their food rations 
from 2003 to 2007, and those who did rarely received their full entitlement.”357  In the 
last four years, as the chart below will show, the food ration has barely reached the 400-
grams per day well below the government and WFP mark.358  
 
As early as 1993, low ranking military personnel experienced food shortages.359  
In 1996, the DPRK established the “militarization of agriculture” and sent military 
soldiers to work on the farms and to prevent food hoarding.360  Eventually the 
government sent the soldiers to seize the food for the troops.361  Those soldiers 
stationed on a farm, were better off than urban soldiers were as farmers bribed soldiers 
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with food.362  As conditions deteriorated, many soldiers deserted in search of food, while 
others were sent back to their villages when the military did not have enough to feed 
them.363  As rations became tighter, corrupt high-ranking officials stole the food meant 
for the people and lower ranking soldiers to use for their own personal gain.364   
The food shortages were having a profound impact on North Korean children.  In 
1998, 62% of North Korean children were stunted from malnutrition, the numbers varied 
from province to province.  Those of the lowest Songbun classification living in the north 
had the worst numbers.365  The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO), states that the health of children is usually a good indicator of the health of a 
community.366  World Health Organization (WHO) maintains, “Stunting is the result of 
inadequate nutrition and causes long-term negative effects on the child’s ability to grow 
and learn, and to develop into productive adults later in life.”367  Restricted development 
affects whole societies and nations; it can create a long-term health and humanitarian 
burden for the country.   
It was not until 1995 that the DPRK appealed to the outside world for help with 
the famine, blaming natural disasters.368  The government concealed the true conditions 
of the famine from the outside world and from its own people, which led to deaths.  
North Korea’s choice to withhold of necessary data made it difficult to provided targeted 
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humanitarian and development assistance in the country.369  The DPRK violated its 
citizen’s right to information hindering their ability to develop coping skills to combat 
starvation early on, escapee’s testified about people starving in their homes waiting for 
their food rations.370  They also tell how “the elderly went out into the fields to die so 
they did not burden their families and children were so weak they could not hold up their 
heads.”371  North Korea was aware of the food crisis well before the mass flooding and 
their eventual plea for assistance.   
During the famine, the state continued to maintain laws and controls criminalizing 
efforts by the people to find alternatives to starving, such as moving to areas where food 
was a little more plentiful or bartering for food.372  Military spending continued without 
reduction it was still top priority throughout the famine.373  The state used food as a tool 
of control over its population; it prioritized those it felt were more deserving and crucial 
to maintaining the regime over those it viewed as expendable.374  North Korea has 
received food aid from 1995 through 2015.  After six years, donor fatigue was setting in, 
as awareness that the food deficit was only partly due to natural disasters.375  Food aid 
does not address the absence of structural changes and development plans, and as 
North Korea was not forth coming in possible reforms to elevate their food shortage 
donors were less incline to contribute.  By 2015, there was a stream of contradictory 
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information on North Koreas economic problems and food shortages.376  First, there 
were reports of the worst drought since the 1995 appeal for help.  Followed by 
declarations that the harvest was the best they had seen in decades thank to the 
agricultural reforms Kim Jong-un put in place.  By the fall, the picture was dire, the 
harvest were not going to be able to yield the amount of food necessary to feed the 
population, the WFP announce it extended its aid to North Korea over the next year.377  
It remains to be seen if North Korea has in fact made agricultural reforms that will yield 
an adequate harvest next year. 
Discrimination 
When the Songbun class system was created, no one was excluded from the 
political process based on his or her Songbun status.378  The Korean War contributed 
significantly to the strong class distinction that is prevalent today.  Those who “sacrificed 
for the fatherland, were given higher status over those who supported the South, United 
Nations, or chose not to be join the military.”379  The WPK defined those that did not 
sacrifice for the fatherland, returned prisoners of war and families of those that migrated 
south as hostile to the regime whether their opposition was real or perceived.380  The 
May 30th 1957 Resolution began the loyalty classifications for all citizens, the enactment 
of the Cabinet Decree No. 149 ordered the removal of the hostile class to the northern 
mountainous provinces, separating friend from foe from within the North Korea 
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population.381  The labels attached to citizens during this period have been passed 
down generation after generation. 
The process of determining a person’s status is not transparent, and North 
Korean citizens cannot challenge the results.  At birth, a baby’s Songbun classification 
system is assigned after an examination is conducted on their parent’s status.382  The 
consequences began early in school were grades were determined by Songbun and not 
performance.383  Songbun controls every aspect of their lives what jobs they can do 
after school to their ability to travel, how much food or health care they receive and even 
who they can marry.384  The commission found that the “Songbun system leads to 
structural discrimination whereby generations become locked into disadvantage and 
social mobility is not possible.”385  Once assigned the baby’s status it is theirs for life 
barring any acts of wrongdoing or in limited cases, they rise to a higher status.  Losing 
status is much easier; all it takes is a political crime as determined by the state.386   
Women’s rights 
Within the Songbun system, women have become one of the most vulnerable to 
discrimination with nowhere to turn for protection.  At the time of Korea’s division Kim Il-
sung reportedly supported equal rights for the women who participated in the 
independence movement.  He declared that they would be on equal footing with men 
and receive assignments suited to their abilities and aptitudes and he also introduced 
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the “Law of Sex Equality,” in 1946.387  The law emphasized free marriage and divorce, 
equal rights to inherit property, it prohibited the buying or selling of women, and 
prostitution.  Women were promoted into the labor force where they received paid 
maternity leave, reduced work hours for mothers with young families and free nurseries, 
and kindergartens.388  The introduction of women into the work force served to 
breakdown the family as it took the economic power away from male head of the family 
as did the creation of institutionalization of childrearing.  The institutionalization of 
childrearing consisted of state run nurseries and schools, set up to start Kim ideology 
indoctrination early.389  Kim Il-sung’s cult image portrayed him as the father of the 
people, the patriarch.390  The enactment of the Law of Sex Equality was not enough to 
change the Patriarchal mentality of the society to allow women to achieve gender 
equality.391   
In the 1990s as the economy deteriorated, so did the rights of the women.392  
Women were dismissed from the work force, labeling working for the state as “men’s 
work.” 393  Since the men were still required to report to work and they were not being 
paid, the women had to assume the duties as the breadwinner.394  As the economy 
collapsed the women who did not work for the state, and did not have to report to work 
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every day, began operating private markets.395  The state imposed restrictions on these 
markets and at times cracked down on them, yet the women continued the markets due 
to the need to feed their families.  Women are still subservient to their husbands and 
with women bringing home the food and money, this has lead to an increase in 
domestic violence, as the men are unable to cope with the changing gender roles.396  
Women have begun to experience violence outside the home.   
Sexual assaults became commonplace, escapees testified, “That soldiers 
demanded sex from women who were caught committing minor violations.”397  Article 
280 of the North Korean penal code states it is a “crime to force sex on a woman in a 
subordinate relationship.”398  Even with this law in place, Officials do not fear 
punishment for their actions towards women.399  Women turned towards prostitution to 
procure food and money needed to provide for their families,400  If the women is caught 
they are punished while the men are released.401  Women who cross over into China in 
the hope to acquire food often become victims of trafficking networks.  If North Korean 
women are caught in China, they were forcibly sent back to North Korea where they are 
immediately sent to a prison camp.   
Both North Korea and China have strict laws against trafficking and apply stiff 
penalties to include execution.  Yet China’s refoulement practice and North Korea’s 
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punishment for repatriation render the victims helpless.402  If the women are pregnant at 
the time of their capture, they are subjected to forced abortions in the camps or if they 
are too far along they are allowed to give birth and then the guards kill their babies “in 
an effort to adhere to the “pure Korean race.”403  North Korea’s discrimination against 
women places them in positions of vulnerability, which is made worse by their inability to 
protest or fight against these violations.404  The women’s organizations are not voluntary 
they serve only to promote party politics, that have no political influence or the ability to 
promote women’s rights.405 
Freedom of Expression 
The people’s lack of ability to politically influence or promote rights violates their 
right to freedom.  North Korea has a “Freedom House Rating” of seven, the lowest 
rating available.  North Korea’s media and education “concentrates on promoting Juch’e 
ideology and deification of the Kim Dynasty.”406  The North Korean people learn from a 
very early age not to question their Supreme Leaders.407  All North Koreans are 
required to know and be able to recite the Ten Principles by heart.  The Ten Principles 
is used to suppress individualism; it promotes the one-ideology system calling for the 
unconditional obedience:408  With the implementation of the Ten Principles came the 
formation of the evaluation meetings in which citizens conducted self-criticism sessions, 
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to insure they were living up to the Ten Principles.409  Those found violating the Ten 
Principles are “heavily penalized and sent to prison camps, as those violations are 
considered as ideologically impure.”410  Kim Jong-un amended The Ten Principles in 
2013 to include references to his father Kim Jong-il.  After Kim Jong-un executed his 
uncle in 2013, he ordered the indoctrinations sessions to increase and expected the 
population to pledge their loyalty in writing.  The execution created fear and bafflement 
leaving the population, and those in the upper core, to understand that there was no 
room for criticism of the process, through its lack of transparency, and the hasty and 
violent ending.411  These intense state indoctrination sessions take place in a country 
that does not tolerate facts or opinions critical to its official ideology.  Any criticism, 
rejection, or idleness on these principles is a political crime.412 
The purpose of the system is to create loyal subjects committed to the Supreme 
Leader and to instill hostility towards Japan, the United States, and South Korea.413  
North Korea established an elaborate surveillance system, under the WPK to monitor 
for expressions of sentiments deemed anti-state or anti-revolutionary.  This includes 
secret informers, and the neighborhood watch, which assigns a person who monitors 
their residents’ actions.  Since the 1990s, citizens have been secretly exercising their 
right to knowledge by listening to South Korea radio, watching South Korean television 
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or foreign DVDs, and using cell phones to acquire new information from outside of North 
Korea.  If caught they can be charged with a political crime.414 
Travel 
When it comes to travel, the DPRK does not only mistrust any foreigner entering 
the country, they also closely check and double check on North Koreans traveling 
abroad.415  The North Korea authorities maintain their control over the people in order to 
prevent any social or ideological influences from entering their country.416  North 
Koreans must have a travel certificate to move to a “location other than their registered 
area of residence,” within or outside North Korea.417  Under international pressures, in 
1998 the DPRK added article 75 to the constitution guaranteeing the right to freedom of 
residence and travel.418  In reality, authorities continue to restrict movements.  In the 
2000s, the DPRK intensified inspections of travel certificates, if caught without one the 
citizen can receive harsh fines or worse sent to a prison camp.419  Once approved to go 
travel abroad, if the traveler fails to return, their families are sent to the political labor 
camps.420  Restrictions seem to be more limiting for men than women are, as men are 
required to report to work and their absence is noticed sooner.  The women are able to 
move around more freely, as they conduct their own businesses and markets to support 
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the family.421  The number of female refugees that have made it to South Korea has 
increased over the years as shown in the chart below.422 
Year/ 
Classification 98 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Total 
Male 831 565 510 474 626 424 515 573 608 662 591 795 404 369 8,049 
Female 116 478 632 811 1,272 960 1,513 1,981 2,195 2,252 1,811 1,911 1,098 1,145 18,668 
Total 947 1,043 1,142 1,285 1,898 1,384 2,028 2,554 2,803 2,914 2,402 2,706 1,502 1,514 26,717 
 
When Kim Jong-un took power, North Korea stepped up their efforts to control 
defections.  Kim Jong-un reinstated heavy penalties if citizens are caught crossing the 
border illegally they are sent to the political prison camps.  During Kim Jong-il’s reign, 
punishments had become lenient, if caught citizens faced a fined or a limited sentence 
in a labor training facilities as punishment.423  Persecutions of family members of those 
who had defected or have family members, whose whereabouts are unknown, have 
become worse.424  The families of escapees are ordered to register with the local 
People’s Security Bureau for monitoring or are sent away to prison camps.425  The 
number of refugees shown in the chart does not give a factual account of the number of 
people who have tried to escape North Korea.  Due to the closed off nature of North 
Korea and China’s active reparation of those caught, it is unlikely to know the true 
number of the North Koreans who have attempted to leave.  
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Prison camps 
One of those viewed as expendable are the prisoner in the prison camps.  North 
Korea persistently denies that is has prison camps, their very existence is a state 
secret, and they have been disguised as military or farming facilities.426  In 1979, the 
North Korean prison camps became known in international human rights circles, when 
Amnesty International campaigned for the release of Ali Lamada from Venezuela, a 
translator who worked in North Korea for the DPRK.427  Amnesty published his account 
of his time in prison; his story is remarkably similar to the testimonies from escaped 
North Koreans.  The next account was from the Minnesota Lawyers International 
Human Rights Committee and Human Rights Watch/Asia released a report in 1988, 
discussing the camps.428  The international community has known of the camps since 
1979, yet they have not addressed the abuses during political negotiations. 
During the Korean War, documents captured from North Korea showed that “The 
Process and Guidelines for Executing Forced Labor” announced the creation of labor 
camps in 1947 by the Soviet Unions.429  The prison labor camps were enlarged during 
the 1950s to accommodate the number of people sentenced during Kim Il-sung’s 
political purges.430  Initially Kim Il-sung purged Japanese collaborators in the 1940s then 
it became political opponents and rival socialist in the 1950s to 1960s.  This turned into 
imprisoning anyone who displayed opposition to the Workers’ Party of Korea, the state 
policies and to the Kim Dynasty.  Kim Il-sung instituted the “guilt by association” policy 
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where whole families, including children or grandchildren, are imprisoned along with the 
offender.431  “Under an edict from Kim Il-sung in 1972, up to three generations must be 
punished in order to wipe out the “seed” of class enemies.”432  David Hawk, of the 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, “there are no trials for those in the political 
camps, but presumed deviants are suspected of wrongdoing, wrong thinking, wrong 
knowledge, wrong association or wrong background.”433  The commission received 
accounts of party officials and their families who did not receive a trial or court 
sentencing prior to being sent to the prison camps and were assigned to hard labor.434  
It is estimated that 80,000 to 120,000 are imprisoned within four remaining prison 
camps, as of 2014.435  The North Korean government continually denies the use of 
torture and human rights violations.  They declare the violations have disappeared due 
to law revisions and that law enforcement officials receive thorough training to prevent 
committing these violations.436  The lives in these prisons include daily abuses, and 
often deadly conditions; insufficient food leading to starvation, vitally no medical 
treatment, lack of proper housing or clothing, regular mistreatment, rape, torture and 
executions.437  The abuses begin immediately upon entering the camp; prisoners are 
subjected body cavity searches, performed in order to degrade the prisoners, not to 
obtain evidence.  This is especially so with the female prisoners who usually undergo 
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these examinations in front of other prisoners and guards.438  Ordinary guards are 
performing the examinations and usually in unsanitary conditions.439  International 
criminal law considers any unjustified coercive invasion of the genital opening of the 
victim with a part of the perpetrator’s body as rape.”440   
There are two types of prison camps within North Korea, the “Kwan-li-so” are 
political labor colonies and the “Kyo-hwa-so” are long-term prison labor facilities.441  
“The prisoners’ day-to-day life consists of performing hard and at times dangerous 
labor.” 442  Although North Korea used the Soviet Gulag as a template to establish 
Kwan-li-so prison camps based on the testimony of exiled North Koreans, many 
features of the DPRK camps are harsher than the Gulag camps.443   
The Kyo-hwa-so which means, “a place to make a good person through re-
education,” are prisons for criminal offenses.444  They are labor training camps and the 
families of prisoners do not join them, but are aware of their location.  As part of their 
reeducation process, after a long day of labor, the prisoners are required to memorize 
Kim Il-sung’s speeches, the New Year’s Day Joint Editorials, and take part in organized 
“self-criticism” sessions.445  Many of these prisoners have had some form of judicial 
process, and receive fixed term sentences.446  While the facility may physically 
resemble prisons in other countries, the offenses do not resemble crimes that would 
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normally be punishable in other countries.  Such as private economic transactions that 
are not done within an officially appointed workstation.447  A citizen crossing the Korean 
Chinese boarder in search of food during the famine is another example of such a 
crime.   
Kwan-li-so is a “management place” in its literal translation or the common 
English translation “political prison camp.”448  Kwan-li-so are correctional labor camps, 
most of these victims are sentenced for life, inmates are denied contact with the outside 
world, and their families that did not join them are not informed if they are alive or dead, 
they just stop existing.449  There have be reports of releases which took place on the 
birthdays of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, released prisoners and guards are forbidden to 
talk about the camps with anyone outside the camps.450   
Kwan-li-so prisoners are imprisoned for political reasons without the benefit of a 
trial or court sentencing.451  Those sent to the Kwan-li-so prisons lose their rights as 
citizens; they fall under the rules or lack of rules of the guards.  There have been a 
number of reports in which public executions are held and other reports of prisoners 
being taken away and never coming back widely believed to be executed in secret.452  
Usually the public executions were carried out on those who attempted to escape.453  
Testimonies from former guards who have defected and from former prisoners all tell of 
witnessing many executions within the prisons.  Mr. Hawk reports “Starvation food 
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rations, forced labor, routine beatings, systematic torture, and abuse, along with 
executions put the North Korean camps in the ranks of history’s worst prisons for 
political offenders” even comparing them to the Nazi concentration camps.454     
North Koreas judiciary and prison system violates the ICCPR Articles 7, 9, 10 
and 14 which protect citizens from arbitrary arrest or detention, to a fair and public 
hearing, protection from torture and inhuman treatment.455  The commission found that 
the due process is absent throughout the justice system, oversight of the detention 
processes for crimes in the DPRK are controlled by the Office of the Prosecutor.456  
Based on testimonies from escapees, the more political a case is the less likely the 
suspect will receive due process in a court.  Those suspected of political crimes are 
held in detention centers for months, where they are degraded, intimidated, and 
tortured, until a confession is received.”  The State Security Department (SSD) makes 
the decisions on highly political cases outside the judiciary process, while reserving the 
judiciary process for political cases of medium security, and handing off the less serious 
crimes to the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS).457  The MPS works in reverse, the 
serious crimes go through the judiciary process, and bypasses the courts for less 
serious crimes.  These organizations are considered safeguards of the party, protecting 
people’s lives from various criminal infringements.458  In North Korea, citizens of the 
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hostile class are considered enemies of the state, escapees have testified, “people of 
low Songbun who have committed a crime face harsher punishments.” 
  
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five 
Attempts at Solutions 
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Economic reforms 
In an effort to ease the economy crisis during the 1990s, China inspired North 
Korea with the success of its Special Economic Zones (SEZs).  The SEZs in North 
Korea would operate as a tourist area, an industrial complex, or a port open for use by 
China and the Soviet Union.  In 1991, the DPRK created the Rason SEZ near the 
Chinese Russian border in an effort to try to bring in international capital in nine years it 
generated $150 million.459  Rason lacked of transportation, energy, and communication 
infrastructures majorly impeding early visits by Chinese tourist.460  This earlier SEZs did 
not live up to expectations, but with the breakdown of the PDS during the famine, North 
Korea had a greater need for financial resources, they expanded their SEZs in the 
2000s.461  These new include the Kaesong-Industrial Complex (KIC) that was a joint 
venture with South Korea, Mount Kumgang Tourist Zone; by the mid 2000s both of 
these zones closed due to international tensions.462  Since Kim Jong-un has become 
leader, there is a renewed interest in reopening the SEZs.  North Korea has 
collaborated with China and Russia to improving the infrastructure of the Rason.  In 
October 2013, The DPRK announced they will be building fourteen new SEZ within 
North Korea over the next few years.  The DPRK reports that they have signed 
contracts with Singapore, Hong Kong, and China to start construction of these new 
sites.463 
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Other types of economic reforms during the 1990s and 2000s included legalized 
markets, increased wages, devaluing the won, and authorized state enterprises to enter 
into market activities.464  The State Development Bank was formally opened in 2010, it 
was designed to bring in outside capital, and also functioned to finance economic 
recovery projects such as building the country’s ailing infrastructure.”465  North Korea 
hoped that these reforms provided incentives and would attract more foreign 
investments.  Since Kim Jong-un’s political appointment, there is a new interest in 
reform efforts.  After Kim Jong-un became heir apparent, he began visiting the 
economic zones on 58 separate trips while only making 33 trips to visit military 
installations.466  The number of trips to the economic zones is viewed that he will be 
focusing on economic reforms as a way to secure his legitimacy.467   
After his father’s death, Kim Jong-un continued to associate himself with 
economic performance.  Kim Jong-un has expressed his concern about North Koreas 
poor economy, and food deficiency.  In a November 2011 statement, he refers to “food 
as more critical than bullets.”468  A top Korean official, Yang Hyong-sop, stated that Kim 
Jong-un was pursuing a “knowledge-based” economic system and implementing 
additional economic reforms similar to those used by China.469  North Korea is sending 
people to China study its public companies and factories, while also meeting with 
Chinese commerce-related officials in hopes of learning how to implement similar 
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strategies at home.470  It remains to be seen if the economic reforms the DPRK 
instituted under Kim Jong-un, will alleviate the economic problems facing the country in 
the long term.  "What should not be forgotten, however, is that the country is not poor ... 
the resources of the country are misspent, misallocated and misused on the elite and 
the 'military first' policy to the detriment of the populace.”471  
NGOS 
The Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs), responded to North Korea’s plea in 1995 for food aid, in an effort 
to prevent deaths from starvation.472  Unlike other humanitarian emergencies, North 
Korea’s government was still intact, creating a political environment that the foreign aid 
workers had to navigate.  In time, they realized the food crisis they responded to did not 
originate with the floods as previously reported, although the flooding made a dire 
circumstance worse.  The experiences in Africa and other parts of the world did not 
prepare the foreign aid workers for the obstacles they faced in North Korea.  The NGOs 
policies in the past have insisted on transparency of the delivery process of the received 
aid.473  This would not be the case in North Korea. 
The major obstacle faced by the foreign aid workers was the constraints put in 
place by the DPRK.  North Korea rigidly controlled the process of aid distribution, the 
aid workers were limited to the amount of contact they had with the Korean people, 
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officials monitored them at all times.  The aid workers could not move around as they 
wish, they were only allowed in specified counties to access the famine, they had to 
give a notice before visiting a specific area, when visiting the counties they were 
escorted by the DPRK officials and their contact with ordinary citizens was severely 
limited.  DPRK officials prohibited foreign Korean language speakers to work in the 
country; they assigned the aid workers to work with the Flood Damage Rehabilitation 
Committee (FDRC) that oversaw all international aid relief efforts within the country.474  
Aid workers were under specific rules about where and when they could monitor the 
distribution of the food received.  
North Korea insisted that the aid received was to go through the PDS 
governmental distribution system, officials shielded foreign visitors from the worst of 
their people’s suffering, while struggling to make sure that they were exposed to 
sufficient suffering to create sympathy and support for continued aid materials.475  By 
distributing the food through the DPRK’s PDS system, aid workers could verify that the 
food arrived at the PDS but were unable to monitor if it went to the neediest of citizens. 
476   Initially the DPRK altered labels identifying food aid so the ordinary citizen did not 
know the food was coming from someone other than the government.477  Since all of the 
food was distributed through the government, “it became part of the system of 
oppression.”478  This became a point of contention as the aid workers felt that many who 
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needed the food were not getting it, there were suspicions that North Korean officials 
diverted significant amounts of humanitarian aid to their military.479   
Medical aid workers quickly realized that North Korean medical personnel were 
lacking in modern day skills.  It became clear that there had been little or no interaction 
with the international community as their skills reflected the standard knowledge of the 
1960s and 1970s.480  Medical aid began to be combined with training due to restrictive 
movements and the inability to reach those in need left the medical aid workers 
uncertain their programs were actually making a beneficial impact.  This doubt is the 
reason the medical relief organizations left North Korea in 1998.481  The difficulties the 
aid workers experience prompted many organizations to leave North Korea after a few 
years. 
 Humanitarian aid constituted a direct threat to Juch’e, threatening to undermine 
the central role of the state.482  The notion of give and take in international diplomacy is 
a foreign concept to North Korea, ”their rules are based on a zero-sum game in which 
only one side can win.”483  North Korea officials did not want their country to be seen as 
impoverished or be treated like a “third world country,” to save face, meant that much of 
the aid given to North Korea was offensive to the North Korean leadership, if not 
unacceptable at the time.”484  Used items became a problem, even though in good 
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condition and better than the ordinary citizen owned or the medical community utilized.  
North Korea viewed aid contributions as gifts that were presented by a visiting 
delegations, much in the same manner that tribute was received in the Chinese Imperial 
court.  The officials linked the quality and presentation with the amount of respect the 
visitor had for the court.  By using this tactic, North Korea was able to portray itself as a 
Country receiving gifts from the outside world and not as a poor nation in need of 
handouts.485  North Korea became insulted at any slight suggesting they were needy or 
underdeveloped.  The officials were focused on receiving materials needed and not 
interested in advice on how to improve their country.  NGOs worked on the premise that 
“if you teach a man to fish, you feed him for a lifetime.  North Koreans felt not only did 
they know how to fish, but that Kim Il-sung invented fishing.”486   
   North Korea decided on the number the number of aid workers allowed to enter 
the country, to the amount of money the foreign aid organization brought with it to the 
negotiating table.  Delegations were expected to bring token donation to every meeting, 
this expectation was even higher for those who wanted to establish a presence within 
North Korea.  Fact-finding mission were not allowed the organizations and aid workers 
had to rely on the word of North Korea officials.487  The aid workers timed their visits 
with the arrival of aid was scheduled to justify their visits.488  Foreign relief workers 
complained that at times the officials were so demanding that it felt like they were 
paying to bring aid into the country.489   
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North Korea is entering its twentieth year of emergency humanitarian assistance.  
The WFP remains the largest food aid provider to North Korea.  Over the years, 
competing demands from countries in need has resulted in “Donor Fatigue.”490  “Donor 
fatigue” was becoming apparent in 2003, as there have been no reforms to change 
agricultural and economic shortages within North Korea.  The biggest problem comes 
from the figures that show North Korea has effectively used the inflow of aid to offset its 
own commercial food imports.  The charts show that as aid was coming in, the amount 
of government money spent on food imports declined.491   
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The WFP is having a difficult time raising donations needed to help the North Korean 
people.  International community continues to watch as North Korea continues to take 
an aggressive stance and continually launch missiles and purchase high-end 
merchandize for the core class and promoting tourist areas for the rich all the while 
allowing its citizens to starve.   
In 2010, WFP stated they had received one third of the required amount of food 
to address the needs of the North Korean people.492  By 2014, the WFP was 
considering closing down their facility as they only raise a fraction of the aid they 
needed.493  In the spring of 2015, North Korea was stating they expected to have the 
worst drought in 100 years.494  In April, the United Nations called for $111 million to fund 
crucial humanitarian needs this year in North Korea, which it said remains drastically 
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under-funded.495  The UN’s emergency response fund (CERF) was only able to 
allocated $6.3 million to counter the impacts of the drought.496  By July 2015, the DPRK 
was stating that this year’s harvest had actually increased despite adverse weather 
conditions, due to implemented agricultural reforms.497  The dilemma remains does the 
world continue to send aid to support those suffering the most and help prop up the 
regime or stop the aid and hope that the North Korean government increases funding to 
import food for the people? 
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Conclusion 
From the inception of the Songbun class division to the military first policy North 
Korea’s political system produced a governmental facilitation arena for human rights 
abuses.  Kim Il-sung took the Yangban class system from the Chosŏn Dynasty era and 
flipped it on its head to create the Songbun class system.  Raising up the peasants and 
casting down the privileged to create a new order.  Kim Il-sung and his guerrilla soldier 
followers made up the upper classes, and purged anyone who represented or promoted 
political ideal that was different from the world they wished to create.  Class status 
became hereditary with little chance of changing the classification received at birth, 
cementing the upper class and their descendents firmly into positions of power and 
control over the country. 
The Juch’e principles “Chaju” domestic and foreign independence policy, 
“Charip” economic independence policy and “Chawi” military independence policy grew 
out of the historical experiences of foreign dominance and would become an essential 
component of North Korea’s political system.  With Juch’e, Kim Il-sung set about 
creating a policy that in theoretically gives back some semblance of self to the country.  
For almost forty years, foreign governments controlled Korea, the desire for 
independence and self-governance was strong.  To achieve this he believed the people 
needed unify to achieve an economically stable infrastructure and have military strength 
to achieve independence.   
North Korea has never achieved economic independence, after the division they 
relied on the Soviet Union for aid and when its aid stopped North Korea turned to China.  
China has since provided substantial amounts of food, resources, and finances.  
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Nevertheless, even China’s aid could not make up for the inadequate policies that 
would lead to North Korea’s economic and food crisis.  The DPRK asked the 
international community for agricultural food aid for the past twenty years.  Yet they are 
still able to afford their luxury items and military expenses because of the weapons 
sales and illegal activities.  Their need for military independence comes from their fear 
and weakness felt during the Korean War.  They obsessive need for military strength 
and independence, came from the sacrifice of their economic independence.  The 
country chose to put all their resources into the military first policy, at the expense of 
their infrastructure, agriculture, and people. 
The original policies have moved far beyond the ideals for which they were 
intended.  Kim Il-sung as well as Kim Jong-Il have used these policies to create a state 
ruled by one party that is controlled by one person, who is in charge of a government 
that is not content on just ruling over a country of people.  They have set up a political 
system that controls every aspect of its citizens’ lives.  Every violation listed by the 
United Nations Commission of Inquiry is possible because of those policies and laws 
that are in place.  From birth to death, the system dictates the where, when and why of 
everyday life.  If a citizen questions or criticizes the system, they have committed a 
political crime, which results in hard labor for life at a prison camp.   
Another measure of control used by the government is food distribution system 
that made the citizens dependant on the government for their food.  The food shortages 
are a direct result of implementing unsound agricultural techniques areas terrain 
resulting in poor crop yields.  When combined with environmental disasters the DPRK 
could not provide the food needed to its entire population.  During the famine women 
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found the level of violence directed at them increased, in an already extreme patriarchal 
society that did not enforce the laws currently in place to protect the women.  The 
policies set forth by the Workers Party of Korea, obstruct the personal freedoms of the 
people.  The state uses surveillance, fear, and punishment to prevent all forms of 
expression that may lead to rebellion.  Those who receive permission to travel abroad 
are monitored to make sure they do not bring influences from foreign countries into 
North Korea that would threaten the security of the regime.  If anyone is caught 
watching or listening to foreign media, they are punished by being sent to the prison 
camps.  If a North Korean escapes and is caught in China they are repatriated back to 
North Korea and sent to the prison camps.  All of these violations are actions that many 
people around the world take for granted. 
The international governments have failed to restrain North Korea on many 
issues.  North Korean escapees receive little humanitarian protection or support from 
the international community.  China has not been held accountable for their role in 
committing human rights violations in regards to their repatriating North Korean 
escapees caught in China.  Nor have many international countries honored the 
sanctions put in place by the United Nations, even if the sanctions enacted in response 
to North Korea’s nuclear program.  Currently North Korea’s nuclear program 
overshadows human rights abuses during international negotiations.  The six countries 
talks focus on preventing threats of war and not human rights abuses.   
Since Kim Jong-un’s succession, there were predictions that he would be the one 
to reform North Korea.  To date there have not been any visible positive changes to 
North Korea’s policies, yet there have been several international altercations since he 
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became the ruler of North Korea.  Escapees have testified that Kim Jong-un has 
reinstated harsher measures toward political crimes.  Information has been made 
available that states Kim Jong-un plans to focus on the economy in conjunction with 
military first policy.  This is a tight rope for the regime to balance, they have to keep the 
military happy to prevent a coup, but it is apparent that the country needs to make 
changes to remain stable.  Food aid was helping, but with donor fatigue causing the 
contributions to decrease every year, North Korea cannot count on the international 
community to continue to support their agricultural needs.  Kim Jong-un would have to 
allocate resources to improve the croplands and be open to receiving agricultural and 
crop technology from other countries, instead of continually relying on disguised 
handouts.  This may require the government to break from its closed society policy and 
allow the outside world to come in. 
The international community’s have a responsibility to end the human rights 
abuses in North Korea.  There are several possible options available to deal with the 
human rights issues in North Korea.  One is to have all the treaty nations come together 
to act in unison to implement the same sanctions on luxury goods, and adhering to 
those sanctions across the board, until human rights reforms are enacted and enforced.  
The international community should act together to put pressure on the Chinese 
Government to fulfill its obligations to protect the North Korean escapees by declaring 
them refugees and respect the right of North Koreans to seek and enjoy asylum.  The 
international countries should also pressure China to use its influence to do more in 
persuading North Korea to turn some of its focus on reforming current policies that 
permit the human rights abuses.  North Korea is not going to give up the biggest 
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bargaining chip they have any time soon.  The nuclear program makes them feel safe 
but more importantly gives them a sense of power, especially negotiating power.  The 
International community should not give up on trying to persuade North Korea to give up 
its nuclear program, but pressuring them to end their human rights abuses should be on 
the agenda during negotiating talks. 
The solution to North Korea’s nuclear program and their human rights violations 
are not easy solutions.  Rarely do the all the treaty nations agree to act in unison.  
China has veto power in the United Nations and is becoming an international powerful 
nation of its own right, so would not give in to pressure easily.  The chance that North 
Korea would reform on its own is highly unlikely.  Absolute power corrupts absolutely, 
the Kim dynasty is in its third generation of dynasty rule and the first generation to hold 
absolute power.  Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have proven to be just as ruthless as the 
Kim Il-sung.  The best case scenario would be if the North Korean government chose to 
make reforms to improve the lives of their citizens and become a functioning member of 
the international community.  This is unlikely in the near future.  The second best 
scenario would include the North Korean government to collapse and the international 
world, more pointedly South Korea, stepped in to govern.  China is not likely to allow 
that to happen.  That leaves war, which no one wants and North Korea is willing to 
exploit that fear.  It will be interesting to see how the country survives the next few 
years. 
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